102 NEWBOLD— THE SYRIAC DIALOGUE " SOCRATES." 



composed — light, wind, water, fire and darkness. The elements of 

 the " Socrates " are those traditional in Greek philosophy, except 

 that the Persian term wind is substituted for " air " ; those of Bar- 

 daisan are Persian and are identical with those of the Manichseans. 

 But Ephraim says ("Adv. Haer.," 41, Vol. II., p. 532, Vatican edi- 

 tion) that Bardaisan regarded darkness as "nothing and capable of 

 nothing." It could not therefore have been in his system, as it was 

 in the Persian and Manichsean, the active principle of evil, but was 

 rather a mere negation, analogous to the Aristotelian substratum, 

 a doctrine which Ephraim repeatedly ascribes to Bardaisan. It may 

 be compared to that fifth something which the "Socrates" speaks 

 of as " that which was undififerentiated and unknown " or " un- 

 knowable," although this is not explicitly termed an element. 



According to the " Socrates " the animal soul or life is com- 

 pounded out of the four elements ; its nature depends upon the 

 proportions in which the elements are combined and in particular 

 upon the amount of fire present. The animal soul then consists 

 of four parts. At least some human souls consist of the animal plus 

 the rational soul. The latter has three parts, " Greatness," 

 " Power," and " Goodness," which are the first three manifesta- 

 tions of the " Original Root," a term which in this work is clearly 

 equivalent to " God." Thus the rational soul is divine and those 

 human souls which contain it are composed of seven elements or 

 parts. Ephraim's statements about Bardaisan's theory of the soul 

 have hitherto presented insurmountable difficulties, all of which dis- 

 appear if he be regarded as criticizing the theory of the " Socrates." 

 In one passage ("Adv. Haer.," 54, Vol. II., p. 555) Ephraim say^ 

 that the soul was " made of the existents." The " existents " must 

 have been four in number, for darkness or negation, as representing 

 unconsciousess, could contribute nothing to soul. Elsewhere, 

 ("Second Discourse to Hypatius," p. 8, 5 sqq., Mitchell), he says 

 that the soul consists, according to Bardaisan, of seven parts. Ac- 

 cording to the " Socrates " the first of these statements is true of 

 the animal soul, the second of the union of the animal with the 

 rational soul. Ephraim then describes the dependence of the soul's 

 character upon the proportions of the components precisely as is 



