The Rhctorica of Philodemus. 275 



(a) Their expression d ns 7r/3oetAr;</)e assumes that one can define 

 art as one chooses.^*' 



(b) While criticizing those who do not make proper divisions, 

 they fail to differentiate between the several parts of rhetoric. 



(c) Politics is an art according- to their grouping of the sciences 

 and this is false. For it has no method, nor is it even a con- 

 jectural art. This can be proven by passages from Epicurus 

 and Metrodorus. (Some of which are quoted.) 



(d) It is stupid to say that the rhetors have observed the ele- 

 ments which generally persuade, and have reduced them to a 

 system, and that we persuade by use of prooemium and narrative 

 and the other parts of an oration. 



A fourth class^^ present arguments which are a combination of I, 57, 23 ff. 

 the last two, and are open to the same objections. Their defini- ^5 ff. 

 tion of art is "a state of training acquired as a result of observa- 

 tion, by which the proposed end is obtained generally and with 

 reasonable probability." This removes the distinctive character- 

 istic of an art which is its method and general principles applying 

 to the individual cases. The practical skill acquired by observa- 

 tion is not called an art by the Greeks except that sometimes in a 

 loose use of languag'e people call a clever woodchopper an artist. 

 If we call observation and practice art we should include under 

 the term all human activity. 



They say that politics is not an art, and yet they claim that 

 rhetoric i. e. -n-oXiTiKr] prjTopiKrj is helpful in practical life. How 

 can rhetoric be called an art when it does not help the artist but 

 sometimes makes him inferior to the layman. Dialectic and 

 eristic may be arts by their definition, but in differentiating 

 between them and rhetoric they prove that rhetoric has no 

 method. The other differences which they point out all go to 

 show that rhetoric is not an art. These points of difference are 

 ( I ) when it contributes anything it is something insignificant 

 and accidental; (2) it is not necessary, a layman can do as well 



" Philodemus has in mind in this criticism his purpose to base his judg- 

 ment of rhetoric on the definition of t^x^v accepted by usage. Cf. such 

 passages as I, 69, 2 = Suppl. 35, I : ea-nv toIvw Kal X^yerat irapa rots "EXXrjcrtj' • 

 I, 59, 19 = Suppl. 30, 7 ff. ^ (TW-qdeLa tQv 'EWr/yoji' ■ I, 68, 7 = Suppl. 34^ 14 ; 

 Kara rrjv crvvrjdeiav. 



"■ Possibly these were followers of Diogenes of Tarsus, who derived 

 their arguments from his 'ETr/Xe/crot 2xoXo/. 



