3i6 



Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D., 



I, 256, col. 

 XXII. 



I, 257, col. 

 XXIII. 



I, 258, col. 

 XXIV. 



I, 258, col. 

 XXIV, 1. 26. 



I, 259, col. 

 XXV. 



to the end. Similarly the principles derived by them from 

 "notions" we judge to be just and noble ; but we differ from 

 the common opinion as to what corresponds to the "notion." 

 (I. e. what produces the end — pleasure — which is perceived by 

 all.) 



Not only some philosophers differ from the popular ideas of 

 right and wrong, but all statesmen do. For in their period of 

 office they are wholly concerned to change popular opinion on 

 questions of right and justice and advantage. If this is so, how 

 do we resemble those who scorn current coinage, and seek for 

 substitutes? Apart from the fact that we do not despise theories 

 based on "notions," how could we be said to be acting in this 

 way if we assume the true principles of right and wrong? For 

 some of these are helpful to them as well as to us whether they 

 grant it or not ; others are really established customs, and will 

 not allow themselves to be used unless we assume them in keep- 

 ing with the former principles. For if they do not have the 

 true idea of hot and cold, it is not our authority which they 

 oppose. It is possible for a fate to befall them like that of those 

 who differ (with their states) about coinage — and how can their 

 search be called useless if there is really anything better — if the 

 cities will not accept the innovations, and the inventor's life is 

 not safe. For it makes no difference to those truly well if 

 others will not adopt hygienic measures, nor to those who avoid 

 fire or snow, if others refuse to acknowledge the natural qualities 

 residing in them. It is astounding for them to say that the 

 natural means of safety will not protect them. 



Some things are just or unjust by nature and never change, 

 others vary according to locality and condition. Laws which 

 are not of this nature, but are established for various reasons 

 ought to be obeyed, or if the philosophers do not think that 

 they can live well under these laws they ought to leave the 

 country. They can be social to a high degree by observing 

 those principles which make for likeness and not for dift'erence ; 

 we can do this without being observed as well as with publicity ; 

 with pleasure and not under compulsion ; steadily and not in 

 an uncertain fashion. 



If rhetoric imparts an experience of these things, so that if 

 is the only road to the happy life, yet it does not lead to courts 



