Tlic Rhctorica of Philodemus. 327 



To sum up ; by no means should the philosopher acquire II, 35. col. 

 political experience, or rhetoric of that sort. XXXVIII. 



It is evident that it is the height of folly to say that a study 

 of nature produces a e^cs of political oratory, especially since 

 they introduce into the scheme of philosophy example and 

 enthymeme, and in political speeches use syllogism and indue- n og 

 tion which the dialecticians pride themselves on using accurately, col. 24. 

 If he thinks that philosophical and political arguments differ only 

 in form why does he not show that the political rhetors who 

 have learned the truth according to nature, agree with the phi- ii_ 36, col, 

 losophers in thought and differ only in the form of their argu- XXXIX, 

 ments? What is the value of syllogism and induction if they 

 are equivalent to enthymeme and example? Did they think 

 that in a case in which one can properly use example and 

 enthymeme, the philosopher will be able to use syllogism and 

 induction equally well, or did they think that the geometrician II, 37, 

 is the best statesman since such forms of reasoning are used in *^*^^- ^5- 

 geometry? 



But, as it seems, if one is to consider political questions, the 

 first requisite is a knowledge of affairs ; consequently he must 

 add that the natural philosopher possesses a knowledge of 

 statecraft. For even though he seems to himself to be acting 

 like a statesman, he will not necessarily produce the same result.s 

 as a statesman. He may use procedure analogous to geometry, n, 38, col, 

 but he will not be a geometrician. For everyone who studies ^^^- ^^^ 

 some obscure problem by means of his senses, reasons out the 

 obscure by means of the evident. Statesman, physician and 

 geometrician use the same form of syllogism, but one cannot 

 solve the other's problems. How then, if he has sense can he 

 say that reasoning from the evident and existent to the future II, 38, 

 [and unknown] is always useful, and that the ablest political 

 leaders use this form of reasoning. 



compares Isoc. Phil. 84; tois vdfxois Kal rats -jroXiTeiais rais VTrb tCjv ao(f)LcrTu)v 

 yeypa/xixii'ai.s, which is an attack on Plato. He thinks that Philodemus 

 may have used the attack on Plato and Aristotle made by the Isocratean 

 Cephisodorus ; v. Numenius ap. Euseb., Prae. Ev. XIV, 6, 9-1 1, 270, 12-13 

 Dind. I am inclined to consider that Philodemus is referring to the activ- 

 ities of some of the followers of Isocrates who continued their master's 

 practice of broadening their instruction in rhetoric by theoretical work on 

 the science of government of which the works mentioned form a part. 



