328 



Harry M. Huhbell, Ph.D., 



II, 39, col. 

 XLI, 1. 14. 



II, 41, col. 

 XLII. 



II, 41, 

 col. 29. 



II, 42, col. 



30, 1. 12. 



n, 43- 



col. 31. 

 II, 44, col. 

 XLIV. 



II. 45. 

 col. Z2. 



II. 45- col. 

 XLV. 



On investigation we shall find that what they call enthymemes 

 are mere padding and provoke applause because the multitude 

 is foolish (col. 27). How can he consider that reasoning from 

 the evident to the obscure in political matters is the same process 

 as interpreting the evident from the past, so that he has left 

 no form of reasoning for any speech except strict induction. 



How do they dare to say that they will interpret political 

 facts better if we philosophers use example instead of induction. 



The tScai (i. e. the fundamental facts) are partly common to 

 all partly different for each city and nation.^" 



Something about the effect of division of speeches. 



Therefore the rhetor is like the dialectician. For the one 

 who is able to use successfully a long connected speech, will be 

 best able to use the method of question and answ-er, and vice 

 versa ; for knowing how long to continue speech to make the 

 idea clear to the audience is equivalent to being able to know 

 how long to make the series of questions which lead the 

 respondent to grasp the new idea. 



Experience is the only guide to forecast the future. 



A philosopher (apparently Metrodorus v. infra col. 32) says 

 that it is a nuisance to observe all these rules about divisions 

 and length, and commends his own philosophy, the reward of 

 which is not pay but freedom from false opinion, which will 

 bring happiness to everyone.^' Therefore Metrodorus consider- 

 ing the claim that the same condition enables one to be both 

 (natural philosopher and statesman) and ridiculing those who 

 consider the dialectic method more accurate, says, "In the case 

 of statesmen and natural philosophers the difference is not the 

 same but the statesman cannot solve the problems of the natural 

 philosopher nor the natural philosopher those of the statesman." 

 What ! in accordance with that foolish change will the statesman 

 make example become induction, or the philosopher do the same, 

 if the subject matter is the same and only the words differ? 

 But in their zeal for such things they laid claim to this, and at 

 the same time they say that these men are not statesmen, so that 



I 



'" On the meaning of lS4ai. cf. the author's The Influence of Isocrates 

 etc. p. 6 fF. 



" This is largely imagination on my part. What is the antecedent of 

 &v 1. 21 ? 



