Tlie Rhctorlca of Philodenius. 283 



This is foolish. For it is not like Epicurus to hesitate to speak I, 109, 7 = 

 the truth. However an obscure statement as to its being an art j^^^ ' 

 is characteristic of the leading Epicureans. One ought not to 

 insist on the letter, but rather follow the spirit of the passage 

 as revealed by comparison with other passages. 



[Opponent.] "Do you not then admit that he agrees with those 

 who declare that rhetoric is not an art, if you admit that he spoke 

 without reservation?" No, for in other places he clearly says 

 that it is an art. 



[Opponent.] "But we claim that So/cei applies also to TroXiTLKrj." 

 (The implication is that if the use of Sokcl instead of ia-n allows 

 one part of rhetoric, viz., sophistic to be an art, it also allows 

 us to consider politics an art, and this is acknowledged to be 

 false.) We grant this, and even grant that SoKet applies to 

 sophistic; for Epicurus did not wish to settle the question by 

 this one passage, and in many others he says that it is an art. 



If anyone should ask Epicurus just what he considered an art 

 and what not, he- would say that the uncertainty of the premises 

 makes the conclusion uncertain. He is in doubt whether all 

 rhetoric depends on practice ; he agrees that it requires much 

 practice. 



Again we say, "li he considered it to be only a matter of I, 112, 7 = 

 practice and experience, he would not have added SoKel." They "^^ " ^ ' 

 said that our interpretation did not give the right meaning, or 

 that it did not give the only meaning. If the first is true we do 

 not understand Greek ; if the second, why do they, too, use 

 obscure language in attacking us? 



I shall show that Epicurus is obscure in the passage on ^pdv?;o-ts I, 112, 24 = 



when he says, oh fxaXXov av S6$€iev eVto-Try/XTy atrt'a etvat r^Trep TpL/St]- alsO "^^PP'* 50. 



that he shows that rhetoric is the result of knowledge and prac- 

 tice, but more of practice than of knowledge; that philosophical 

 theorizing is the result of both, but more of knowledge than 

 of practice ; second, that he shows that philosophical theorizing 

 is the result of both, but of one in a greater degree than the 

 other, while rhetoric is the result of one alone; third, that phi- 

 losophical theorizing is the result of knowledge and not of 

 practice. The opponent chooses one of these interpretations at 

 random. But suppose we substitute ia-n for SoKel ehai so that 



the sentence reads, Sii )U,£V ovk iieipyov rrj prjTopLKjj Swa/xet Trpoe)(€LV, o 



Tpi(3rj<: ia-TL Kal avv7]deia<i iroXXrjs. How can this mean that rhetoric 



