294 Horry M. Hubbell, Ph.D., 



may be facilitated by pretixing a short outline of its present contents to 

 the detailed treatment of the fragments. 



The main body of the book is devoted to X^f«i The first two columns 

 however, do not have any connection with this subject. Column I, vol. I, 

 p. 147 deals with ^i^irts, column TI with the meaning of <t>CKo<To<t>la. The 

 connected fragment begins with column III. III-X discuss the meaning 

 of Koki) as applied to X^fts. XI-XIX treat of faults of style, soloecism, 

 barbarism and obscurity. The second group of fragments (I, p. 162 ff.) 

 begins with a discussion of homoioteleuton (col. I) and collision of 

 vowels (col. II). Col. Ill outlines the following discussion of <t>pd<nt 

 dividing it into rpdnos. ^xwa and TrXdfffia. The first part of the discussion 

 of rpdiros is too fragmentary to permit of any restoration. X-XXII criti- 

 cizes the rhetorical treatment of metaphors, XXIII introduces the subject 

 of allegory, and there the fragment ends; the sections on a-xvi^"- and 

 TrXdffna are entirely lost. The next group of fragments, continuing the 

 criticism of text books of rhetoric, denies that rhetoric can claim the 

 credit for teaching men to avoid faults of speech (col. I^-XI"). XI*- 

 XIX" makes a similar criticism of the rhetorical claims to teach vir6Kpi<Tis, 

 XX^-XXX"* attacks the rhetorician's claim of ability to speak on all sub- 

 jects. XXX^-XL'"^ criticizes the sophistical use of epideictic, denying that 

 the sophistical encomia possess moral value. XLI has a brief remark on 

 Demetrius' peculiar fourfold division of oratory. The book concludes 

 with a summary (XLII-XLIV). 



I. p. 147. They a^ree with us re^^arding what is naturally and truly 



"^^^^ ^- advantageous. Therefore he who has learned what is naturally 



good and bad. and intermediate and indifferent, and has acquired 

 the practical and theoretical means of producing this . . . 



I. 147. Cdl. The restoration of this column is very uncertain. I cannot understand 



II. the use of eiirov (1. 7) with (KdXovu following in 1. It without a connective. 

 The meaning seems to be that the rhetoricians, claiming that their pro- 

 fession was a philosophy and an art, meant that it was a philosophy in the 

 sense in which Isocrates used the term. i. e. the study of the whole of 

 human activity from the standpoint of the orator, and not with the inten- 

 tion of parallelling the Peripatetics and Stoics by propounding a peculiar 

 system of thought. This claim that rhetoric is the most comprehensive 

 of studies is noticed again at the end of the book, I. jj^, i i quoted above, 

 p. .37. 



I. 148, col. This fragment is part of a discussion of the meaning of xaXij a? api'lied 



III. to X(?$ts or (ppdffLi. One possible definition is that KaXrj X^^is is one which 

 can present proi)Osals which shall seem advantageous' in such a way as to 

 win the audience. This dcHnition i^ montinncd only to be rejected. 



* For the thought cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. Rhet. 56: Si6nep braf X^ytrai 6 

 p-f/Tup KaXiji X^feoir elvai KaraaKevaffTiKSs, ^roi Kara. toOto X^ytrai KaOb t)]v t4 

 aviKpipovra irpdyp-ara drjXovaav X^ftf KaTaffKfvdt^ti .... oCre Si Ka06 rifv rd <Tvix<f>ipovTa. 

 irpdynara fj.ijviiovffav • ovSiv yap tffaffi irtpl tovtuv tQv irpayp.dTuv ot pi/iTopti. 



