302 



Harry M. Huhhell, Ph.D., 



Sophists with common sense confine themselves to a discus- 

 sion of poHtical questions, and do not claim to discuss the form 

 of introduction, narration etc. suitable to every question.^** The 

 latter is reserved for the thick-witted crew who fail to distinguish 

 whether i ) only political questions can be treated in these divi- 

 sions, or 2) all questions can be so treated, and that they are 

 the only ones who outline methods adapted to all questions, or 

 3) they are the only ones who have published such treatises. 

 All three positions are unsound, for i) almost all questions are 

 treated according to this division, 2) the technographers have 

 given us no treatises on philosophy or music, 3) other professions 

 have laid down rules for presenting their subject matter. 



The same confusion of thought is found in the claim that the 

 end of rhetoric is to find the possible arguments on any subject, 

 and that rhetoric is alone or almost alone in doing this." In 

 the first place this is nothing more or less than "invention." 

 In the second place if rhetoric can discover the possible argu- 

 ments in questions relating to medicine, music, etc. the rhetori- 

 cians are immediately put into rivalry with the experts in each 

 of these professions. As it is impossible for a philosopher to 

 discover the best possible arguments for some other sect, how 

 can one in a totally different line of activity discover these 

 arguments ? 



Each profession has its own facts and principles, and is alone 

 competent to argue about them. But grant that the end of 

 rhetoric is to find the possible arguments on every rhetorical 

 subject ; the phrase "on every" needs restriction. 



Besides let us say that no good can result from being able to 

 discover arguments, even if it is valuable to have the state of 

 mind which could discover them. For it is clear that he who 



" This paragraph is an attack on followers of Isocrates such as Cicero, 

 who claimed for the orator the right to speak on all subjects. Cf. De 

 Oratore, III, 20, 76, as an illustration of the principle, although Philodemus 

 probably wrote before Cicero: Ilia vis autem eloquentiae tanta est ut 

 omnium rerum virtutum officiorum omnisque naturae, quae mores homi- 

 num quae animos, quae vitam continet, originem vim mutationesque teneat, 

 eadem mores leges iura describat, rem publicam regat, omnia quae ad 

 quamcumque rem pertineant ornate copioseque dicat. 



''This is substantially Aristotle's definition, Rhet. I, 2, i : tcrrw 5i] pr)ToptKr] 

 Svvafj-LS irepl (KaffTov rod deiaprjaat t6 ivdex^f^^^o" TrtOavdv. 



