The RJictorica of Philodemus. 



discovers the inherent arguments must know those which are 

 cogent, and those which are only plausible ; but they are far 

 from knowing what is plausible and what is necessary. Nor 

 do they know what is possible and impossible ; their natural 

 philosophy is of no help to them. Then they need a criterion of 

 truth, and it is folly to think they possess this. If they say 

 that what appears true to the crowd is true, they say nothing 

 more than that the statesman can discover the inherent political 

 arguments; secondly, the majority does not always abide by 

 the same standard of judgment. Perhaps some one will say 

 that a happy life has no need of politics and rhetorical sophistic. 

 I assert that the sophists can, at least as far as their technical 

 treatises are concerned, discover not the slightest argument 

 pertaining to politics. 



Again another will object that the great sophists have no 

 ability in sophistic, as is shown by the published treatises. I 

 say that the arguments of the sophists and statesmen are mostly 

 false. To discover all the arguments requires a deeper and 

 more philosophic understanding. 



Rhetoricians divide their subjects into three parts : forensic, 

 (SiKavtKct), deliberative (o-v^nySovAeuTtKa), and encomiastic (ra ire.pl tovs 

 eVatVous KoX \fj6yov<i). We will omit for the present, discussion of 

 the first two, except to say that some use the term StKao-rr/ptaKoV 

 instead of SiKavtKov, and that deliberative oratory gives advice 

 only on matters affecting the common welfare, and that this 

 advice is not the product of the sophistic art, but of quite a 

 different art. 



In regard to the encomiastic branch of oratory, let us say that 

 political orators frequently employ passages of praise and 

 censure but they do not use them after the fashion of the 

 sophists, nor do they claim to be the only ones able to praise or 

 censure. That is the pretension of the sophists whom we now 

 proceed to answer referring directly to their published works. 

 If they mean that they alone have the power to praise or censure 

 all things, it is right to inquire whether they praise or censure 

 the same object indifferently, or only praise what is praiseworthy, 

 and censure what is blameworthy. If the former, aside from the 

 impossibility of praising that which is blameworthy, there are 

 some things which do not admit of either praise or censure ; 



I, 208, col. 

 XXVIP. 



I. 209. col 

 XXVIII^ 



I. 210, col. 

 XXIXa. 



I. 211, col. 

 XXXa, 19. 



I, 213, col. 



xxxII^ 6. 



