3°4 



Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D., 



I. 215, col. 

 XXXIV'\ 



I, 216, col. 



xxxv^ 14. 



I, 218, col. 

 XXXVII'\ 

 19. 



I. 220, col. 



XXXIXa, 4. 



I, 220. col. 

 XD>. 



if to the second, they arrogate to themselves the knowledge of 

 what is useful or harmful. If they profess to write encomia of 

 gods and heroes, and to praise some men and censure others. 

 we say that the gods do not need any praise of men, especially 

 not the unseemly praise of the sophists. Their praise of brute 

 beasts does no good, for one can not change the nature of 

 animals by this process. 



They say that men are turned to virtue by their encomia, and 

 dissuaded from vice by their denunciations. Bvit the sophists 

 by their praise of Busiris and similar characters, persuade men 

 to become villains. And when they do praise a good man they 

 praise him for cjvialities considered good by the crowd, and not 

 for truly good qualities. If they had real philosophic insight 

 into the nature of virtue and vice, they would seek virtue and 

 avoid vice themselves. 



Not only do they fail at times to praise anything viseful. but 

 they frequently praise bad things, and by lavishing praise on 

 matters of small account they incline us to treat all subjects 

 lightly, and by their praise of men to their faces lead to great 

 confusion. They are ignorant, too, of the proper time to praise, 

 which w^e discuss in our work litpl liraivov. 



Furthermore, no one can believe the encomiasts, because they 

 praise bad men, and often praise and censure the same person. 



The sophists do not excel the poets in their ability to praise, 

 nor even some of the philosophers. In fact any one can do what 

 they claim as their sole possession. \\t grant that they may 

 have a monopoly of such encomia as are in common circulation. 

 That they do any good thereby, we deny. 



Demetrius adds a fovtrth class to those mentioned. This he 

 calls IvTtvKTiKov aira(TLv (obtaining favor with all).^*^ If he means 

 that which obtains favor with the multitude, and with potentates. 

 let him have his point for the present ; later we shall see what 

 comes of it. But he errs in assigning this and the sophistical 

 branch of rhetoric to the same individual. If he takes the search 

 for truth from the philosophers and gives it to the rhetoricians 



'^ Cronert, Kolotes uiid Menedemos, p. 69. refers this to Demetrius of 

 Phalerum. Diogenes Laertius gives among the works of Demetrius (V. 

 5, 80, 81) d7]fjL7]yopiuji> re Kai irpecr^tiGiv . . . ffwayuiyai, and IIpt(7-/3eiiTi*:6s. 

 and his fourth class may be speeches of ambassadors. 



