The Rhctorica of Pliilodemus. 359 



good statesman. In the fi,rst place he is estimated according to 

 his experience in what is advantageous to the state, and in speak- 

 ing, just as the physician is estimated according to his knowledge 

 of what is healthful and unhealthful. If he possesses this, no 

 matter what his character is, there is nothing to prevent his 

 being a rhetor. The same must be understood of one who is H, 270, col. 

 not a rhetor but a statesman. There would be objection if he 

 had to be good, qua rhetor. For the expression qua rhetor 

 means that in this he is a rhetor, and from the same condition 

 and no other can a rhetor arise ; but it is plain to all that many- 

 are capable rhetors, but bad morally. "Qua" is of this nature; 

 if it is added it cannot be removed. Since this is so, we do not 

 consider the political faculty by itself useful either to those who 

 possess it or to the states, but that it is often the cause of ir- 

 reparable dissensions in the sense that what gives the impulse 

 is the cause. If it is accompanied by uprightness of character 

 it often contributes great blessing to states, and sometimes 

 greater good to its possessors than to private citizens, but often- II. 271, col. 

 times greater woe, as is proven by their lives. And if anyone ' 



says that the good statesman ought to have many virtues, and 

 that states are saved not by rhetors qua statesmen, but by good 

 statesmen, he will be right. It would be well if the statesman 

 studied philosophy in order that he mig^ht be more actively good, 

 and for this reason we say that philosophy if it were associated 

 generally with the political state of mind and in individual cases 

 made suggestions applicable to political management, would pro- 

 duce a wonderful improvement. He would be a good rhetor and 

 statesman who possessed kindness, uprightness and temperance 

 in his private life, education, wisdom which is the outgrowth of II, 272, col. 

 his natural ability, and combined with all these, astuteness. XVI^ 



Fragmenta Hypomnematici 



a 



(Nothing.) II, 273, fr. I. 



\\'hen mentioning such a statesman he says that he is experi- fr. II. 



enced in what is helpful and harmful, and possesses all virtues, 



and that the rhetors know none of these things, and do not claim 



to know them, but possess simplv boldness and garrulity. 



II, 274, fr. 

 ... by this line of argument how could Lycurgus, Demos- ni. 



