The Rhetorica of Philodemus. 339 



nature is with a person for all the rest of his life, and does 

 not come "in the brief portion of a day." 



. . . possible to say that he is going to make even the people I, 361, col. 

 understand him in a short time. We may wonder that if he -^^^• 

 knows this, he did not likewise see that there is a difiference 

 between the educated and uneducated in that a clearer statement 

 must be made to the latter. 



Consequently, expecting to hear similar statements about other I, 372, col. 

 forms of expression when he says that the mo-rets are^voi such 

 as evidence, torture, are the common property of all, let us say 

 that the knowledge of these belongs to laymen, but their use 

 depends on opportunity, not on knowledge. 



For just as the physician knows what is probable in disease, I, 373- col. 

 and the pilot knows what is probable in weather, so the rhetor 

 considers the course of political events, when something is going 

 to occur in the state, and from this knowledge he says he is 

 going to persuade the people. 



The rhetor does not combine his proofs after the fashion of a I, 373, col. 

 dialectician or philosopher; for probably this would be dis- ^CIV. 

 pleasing" to the multitude. 



If they bring means able to rid them of many troubles they I, 374, col. 

 will have the philosopher in agreement with them. Making ^^^• 

 them such offers, those who give advice or plead before a court, 

 then express pity and anger. . . . 



with whom the majority wish to include the rhetor I, 374. col. 

 because of his cringing; for he says, "Let him persuade justly " 



and wisely, let him divert their desires, calm their passions and 

 persuade them individually as friends." 



Rhetors prefer to live in a democracy, the worst form of I, 375> col. 



XCVII 

 government. 



[A competent pilot] who did not know where or how or when I, 375, col. 

 to sail would be dangerous, fully as much so as the rhetor [who 

 should try to sail a boat in a storm]. For he could not reason 

 about advantage and harm, as such, even if some one has 

 charmed him into thinking that power over all is teachable. 



[If instead of this] he claims that rhetoric is an art because i, 376, col. 

 the rhetor produces a certain effect on the emotions, then his ^^• 

 shift is not honorable, because it is false that the rhetor pos- 

 sesses universal knowledge, since all poorer artists have wiser 

 men to judge them. 



