314 Harry M. Huhbell, Ph.D., 



it. . . . The philosopher*' is versed in the characters and 

 methods of Hving- which result in faction and exile, through a 

 knowledge of which it is possible most correctly to govern the city 

 and the assembly. The sophists have unawares, made a simile 

 which applies to themselves ; for it is their profession which does 

 not enter into the civil life and the assembly, and is of no help 

 to human life. So it is reasonable that some do not care at 

 all for what they say, but refuse to accept rhetoric and sophistic 

 and politics even cursorily, considering one foolish, the other 

 most inimical to peace of mind. 



I, 245, col. If the remarks following directly after these were intended to 



' ^^* apply to the dialecticians — they are no concern of ours; if they 

 apply to us they are mere chatter, because when we claim to 

 speak accurately as the rhetors cannot because their speeches 

 are composed of probabilities, they proceed to say that spider 

 webs are finer than cloth but less useful ; similarly the finespun 

 subtleties of the philosophers are useless for practical purposes 

 because no one in deliberating uses syllogisms, but probabilities. 

 So that if we use syllogisms, what appeared advantageous at 

 one time would not remain so ; whence there is no one possi- 

 bility which will be advantageous if brought to pass, but the 

 only thing left is to guess on a basis of probability. 

 After assuming that speeches can be made according to strict 

 logic, they proceed to use in 'both deliberative and forensic 

 oratory, nothing but probabilities, and often the less probable 

 rather than the more ; besides they seek broad effect rather than 

 accuracy and systematic treatment, as is natural since they have 

 no method, but depend entirely on observation, and quickly dis- 

 card their observations because of the changes of the populace 

 which are quicker than those of the Euripus.^ But the 

 philosophers do not restrict themselves to rigidly logical 

 argument. . . . 



I, 249, col. The nature of justice and injustice — that one is always advan- 



tageous and the other never, can be settled entirely by strict 

 logic. Anyone who applies guesswork to such subjects is simply 



* Fot: the emendation v. Schneidewin p. 12 f. 



* On the Euripus as a type of fickleness cf . Plato. Phaedo, 90C : Rhet. 

 Gr.W. I, p. 591, 21. 



XVII. 



