376 Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D., 



all in fragments of the second book. The sense of them all is 

 as follows : rhetoric aims at times to deceive ; but the rhetorician 

 is just as liable to be deceived as he is to deceive. A single 

 example will illustrate: II, 90 fr. XVIII, i. 12 vrux; ovxi t6v e^s 



€iTidavix6.(TiL<i TOLOVTOV VTTapxovTa ; " eiTrep diraTtJJaLV ol pyrope^, Kat avTOL 

 (Ltlvl airaTioa-LV, aTraTwvTat, wairep ovSi" aAAoj? ytVerai ev opdaei oiio aKOvaef 

 €1 yap aAAo) (TvpL/Sip-qKev r] aTraTr], kol avTos aTraTarat • ov /xoAAov tolwv 



dTTttToJo-tv rj aTraTwvrat". For the answer to this argument cf. II, 

 88, fr. XVI. . . . aAX' oi a-vp-^i^T^Kev to opdv, ov^ eVe/ca tovtov kol 

 avTos opdrai • to 8e auro Kat eVt t^s aKO^s ovB' dpa 8ia Tov tovs py'jTopa'i 



drraTdv kol avrol aTraTwrat. So much for the argument in Philo- 

 demus ; it does not occur in Sextus, and appears in Quintilian 

 in combination with the preceding argument. This "contamina- 

 tion" will now require our attention. 



Quintilian starts by quoting the first argument that no art rests 

 on false principles, because there can be no "perception" of 

 what is false. Section 18 is a close parallel to Sextus 10. 



Quintilian II, 17, 18 Sextus 10 



altera est calumnia nullam Udaa tolwv Ttyvrj avaTrjixd cVrtv 



artem falsis adsentiri opinion!- ck KaraAi/i/zeajv ri 6e prjTopiKr] ovk 



bus, quia constitui sine percep- «o-Tt a-vo-Trjp-a ck KaraAi/i/'eajv, ws 



tione^*' non possit, quae semper trapadTrjaofxtv • ovk dpa eo-riv 7 



vera sit ; rhetoricen adsentiri prjTopiKt]. tS>v yap i/zcvSciv ovk dal 



falsis, non esse igitur artem. KaraAi/i/zas, i/'cvS^ Se eVrt ra Aeyo/Atm 



Trj<; prjTopLKYJ^ elvai OtMprjfxaTa. 



The proper sequence to this argument in Quintilian is a discus- 

 sion of the diuyprjfiaTa or opiu'wucs of rhetoric to prove that they 

 are true. This would be parallel to the claims of Sextus that 

 such principles as ovtws 6pyy]v KLvrjTtov (11) are false. But 

 Quintilian replaces this by the reply to the argument which we 

 found in Philodemus that rhetoric deceives and is therefore 

 deceived. His general reply is' (19) ego rhetoricen nonnumquam 

 dicere falsa pro veris confitebor, sed non ideo in falsa quoque 



^'' Perceptio is the translation of /carciXij^is as is shown by Quintilian's 

 translation of this definition later in the chapter, section 41 ; artem con- 

 stare ex perceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad fineni utilem 

 vitae; and by Cicero's eqnation in De Fin. III. 5, 18. Rerum autem cog- 

 nitionem quae vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones, vel si haec verba aut 

 minus placent aut minus intelliguntur, ^oraX^feij appellemus licet. 



