Tlic Rhctorica of PJiilodemus. 377 



esse opinione concedani, quia longe diversum est ipsi quid videri 

 et ut alii videatur efficere. This he supports by several examples : 

 Hannibal tricked Fabius into believing that the Carthaginians 

 were retreating, but he did not deceive himself ; Theopompus 

 put on his wife's clothing and passed his keepers without being 

 detected; Cicero befogged the jury in the Cluentius case, but 

 he saw the truth clearly enough himself. These are all answers 

 to the claim that rhetoric is not an art because it deceives ; but 

 by a confusion arising from the use of falsa to represent the 

 Greek words {pev8rj and dTraruivTai Quintilian has been led to com- 

 bine what were originally two separate arguments. 



Quintilian cites and discusses several arguments which are 

 found in the De Oratore. The first two are closely related ; (30) 

 nullam esse artem contrariam sibi, rhetoricen esse contrariam 

 sibi ; nullam artem destruere quod elTecerit accidere hoc rhetorices 

 operi. Both of these are alluded to in passing by Antonius in 

 rejecting the claim that rhetoric is an art (II, 7, 30). The argu- 

 ment is utilized by Sextus (68) who reduces it to the question 

 whether rhetoric can decide between the true and the false; (71) 

 aKoXovOel TO Koi iiricrTrjiirjv avrrjv dXr]6wv re Koi xf/cvBwv ytvecrOat,, tov 

 Trpay/i-aros fx-rj ovrws €;(ovtos. In none of these three discussions 

 is there any indication of the ultimate source of the argument. 



Quintilian next quotes from Cicero the rest of section 30 of 

 the second book of the De Oratore in which Antonius adds to 

 the statements previously quoted the claim that an art must 

 depend on knowledge, whereas rhetoric is concerned wholly with 

 opinion. This claim is treated at greater length by Cicero in 

 the first book (I, 20, 92). Artem vero negabat esse ullam. nisi 

 quae cognitis penitusque perspectis et in unum exitum spec- 

 tantibus, et numquam fallentibus rebus contineretur. Haec 

 autem omnia quae tractarentur ab oratoribus dubia esse et incerta 

 etc. This is marked as a quotation from Charmadas. So far as 

 I know, no trace of this line of thought occurs in Philodemus 

 or Sextus. 



Beginning at section 22 Quintilian discusses two charges which 

 are closely related: i) that rhetoric has no "goal" as all true 

 arts have, and 2) that if it has a goal it seldom reaches it, whereas 

 an art should reach it always or in the majority of cases. We 

 have parallels to this in Philodemus in two small fragments of 

 the second book. 



