ON INSECT SOUNDS. 22^ 



known capacity of the organs of voice, hearing, and conscious 

 *' cerebration " of the insect. 



The assertion that an insect is conscious of a purpose in the cry 

 which it utters, and that the action of its fellow is determined by 

 its perception of that purpose, places Insect voice and movement 

 above all modes of "^ reflex action." But in no Instance is the 

 fallacy so often involved in the reasoning ^' post hoc ergo propter 

 hoc'' more likely to be accepted for truth than In observation of 

 insect life, where the means of testing the supposed connection 

 are so inadequate, and the absence of proof so easily suppHed by 

 imagination. The study of nerve and brain organisation of insects 

 has hardly been commenced, and the amount of psychical 

 endowment with which this organisation may be credited, is still 

 further from being settled. But we may assume it to be beyond 

 doubt that the Insect brain is fitted for functions of a higher order 

 than simple reflex action. Supposing, therefore, the impression of 

 sound received by an organ of hearing to be conveyed to some 

 percipient centre, Intervening as a brain ganglion somewhere 

 in the circuit of sensation and reflex action, the question presents 

 itself, '' what happens In this central part ?" Does consciousness 

 of the impression begin here r If so, and the insect thus become 

 aware of an external sound, is that consciousness passive: that is, 

 does It simply accompany the original Impression, informing the 

 insect with a sense of sound, but without arousing it to any 

 psychical act? If so, consciousness adds no significance to 

 sensation. Does, on the contrary, this consciousness on the Insect's 

 part become a starting point of psychical acts influencing the 

 further course of the reflex action, or diverting into fresh channels 

 the original sensation, then the reflex action becomes compound, 

 that is to say, the direct course and simple resolution of the 

 impression into some accustomed reflex movement Is interfered 

 with and re-directed. Hence arises a further question : are we to 

 conclude that the purely automatic action Is so interrupted as to 

 amount to an action directed by the volition of the insect ? For 



