246 THE CANADIAN NATURALIST. [Aus: 





S' 



Creator. "With regard to the creative force or power, we are still 

 more ignorant. We do not witness its operation. We know 

 nothing, except by inference, of its laws ; and whatever we may 

 succeed in ascertaining as to these, we may be sure that in the 

 last resort we shall, as in the case of all other natural eflfects, be 

 obliged to pause at that line where what we call force resolves 

 itself into the will of the supreme spiritual Power. The 

 " miracle " of enactment must necessarily precede law ; the 

 "miracle" of creation, the existence of matter or force. Those 

 who deny this have no refuge but in a bald scepticism, discred- 

 itable to a scientific mind, or in metaphysical subtilties, into which 

 the zoologist need not enter. 



We must not suppose, however, that the species is absolutely 

 invariable. Yariability, in some species to a greater extent than 

 in others, is a law of specific existence. It is the measure of the 

 influence of disturbing forces from without in their action on the 

 specific unity. In some cases it is difficult to distinguish varie- 

 ties from true species, and with many naturalists there has been 

 a tendency to introduce new species on insufficient grounds. Such 

 errors can he detected ordinarily by comparing large suites of 

 specimens and ascertaining the gradations between them, which 

 always occur in the case of varieties, but are absent in the case of 

 species truly distinct. Such comparisons require much time and 

 labour, and must be pursued with much greater diligence than 

 heretofore, in order to settle finally the question whether the 

 varietal perturbations always tend to return to a state of equili- 

 brium, or whether in any case they are capable of indefinite 

 divergence ft-om the specific unity. 



The species is the only group which nature furnishes to us 

 ready made. It is the only group in which the individuals must 

 be bound together by a reproductive connection. There might or 

 might not be affinities which would enable us to group species in 

 larger aggregates, as genera and families; and the tie which binds 

 these together is merely our perception of greater or less resem- 

 blance, not a genetic connection. We say for example, that 

 all the individuals of the common Crow constitute one species, 

 and we know that if all these birds were destroyed except one 

 pair, the species would really exist, and might be renewed in all its 

 previous numbers. We can make the same assertion with reference 

 to the Raven or to the Blue Jay, considered as species. But if, 

 because of resemblances between these species, we group them in 



