29 



emotion reveals its moral worthlessness. In itself con- 

 sidered it has no more moral significance than muscular 

 spasms. The morality of an emotion depends upon our 

 choices to contemplate the object which calls it into exer- 

 cise. 



After eulogizing the power and value of the emotions in 

 moral and religious reforms, the lecturer said that it was 

 manifest that the temptation to abuse them has a mani- 

 fold power. The proper order for moral and religious 

 instruction is clearly indicated. We must address our 

 efforts to give and guide thought fitted to excite feelings. 

 To reverse this order is fraught with danger. It is not 

 only to put a mere outward expression in the place of an 

 internal reality, but it is to set loose a force whose inten- 

 sity we do not know and the direction of whose working 

 may be toward moral disaster instead of moral life. 



Having explained and variously illustrated this state- 

 ment, the lecturer then passed to the discussion of the 

 mystical interpretations which certain morbid and star- 

 tling disturbances of the mind had received from those 

 who were ignorant of their physical origin. De Quin- 

 cey's passionate love for the three-years-old daughter of 

 Wordsworth and the visions of her form to which he was 

 subject ; Pascal's visions, his belief in their supernatural 

 origin, and the ascetic life he led in consequence ; Lu- 

 ther's interviews with Satan and the preposterous conclu- 

 sions to which they led him, — were adduced to illustrate 

 how nervous disturbances may lead to spectral illusions, 

 while the last two instances show that dangers attend a 

 too ready belief in the supernatural origin of remarkable 

 mental experiences. 



These experiences, when they occur in persons whose 

 characters and piety we respect, if they have a reverent 

 form, we are too much inclined to accept as the result 



