elusive sense. It is oi)vioiis that such fiijurcs must 

 often have included any vvheclcci vehicle, and some- 

 times even the pun carriages. Thus the figure 200 un- 

 doubtedly includes 145 Pennsyh'ania wagons,^ plus 

 a number of British Army wagons, tumbrils, and 

 perhaps gun carriages. By Braddock's own comit 

 he had ajjout 40 wagons over and abo\c tho.se he got 

 from Pennsylvania; "' how many of these were British 

 wagons, tumbrils, or po.ssibly a few of the wagons 

 Gage had impressed on his march to Wills Creek, is 

 imknown.^' 



From the beginning of ihe march, the roads were 

 a challenge, for both Braddock's and Burd's roads 

 presented what appeared to be unsurmountable 

 obstacles. An examination of the terrain o\er which 

 they had to pass causes far greater respect for these 

 road builders and drivers than is usually accorded 

 them. Orme again comes fcjrward with the picture 

 of their labors. Major Chapman had marched from 

 Wills Creek at daybreak of May 30,^- with the ad- 

 vance unit of the army and, says Orme, "it was 

 night before the whole baggage had got over a moun- 

 tain ai)out two miles from the camp. The ascent and 

 descent were almost a perpendicular rock; three 

 waggons were entirely destroyed, which were re- 

 placed from the camp; and many more were ex- 

 tremely shattered." '' Braddock went out from the 

 fort and reconnoitered this section of road. Although 

 300 men and the company of miners had been work- 

 ing on the road for several days, the General "thought 

 it impassable by howitzers," and was about to put 

 another 300 to work when Lt. Spcndelowe of the 

 detachment of seamen informed him of an easier route 

 he had found." Thus the remainder of the wagons 

 were spared the trip over the "perpendicular rock." 



2» Walker, op. cit. (footnote 27), p. 20. Of the 146 wagons, 

 one was apparently uniicrviceablc by the time it reached Wills 

 Creek. Its owner was paid only for his services and the use of 

 his team. 



'" Orme's Journal, in .Sargent, op cil. (footnote 2), p. 321. 



" Ibid., p. 312. 



'- Ibid., p. 323. There is some question here whether the 

 incident reported occurred near Wills Creek, or on June 15 in 

 the Allegheny Mountains. Orme reports two such incidents 

 with identical figures and nearly identical language. Perhaps 

 he was confusing the two places. 



" Ibid., p. 334. When wagons were damaged on the march, 

 and repair was impossible, the load was divided among the 

 other wagons and the unserviceable wagon abandoned. 



'* Ibid., p. 324 (see also Seaman's Journal, in Sargent, op. cit. 

 (footnote 2), p. 381). A detachment of 30 seamen and several 

 ofTiccrs had been detached from the fleet and assigned to the 

 expedition to offer as.sistance in rigging cordages, in the event 

 that the erection of bridges would be necessary. 



In addition to these difTiciiliies of baggage inove- 

 ment, there was the unavoiclalile peril tjf losing horses, 

 particularly at night. Orme gives the following 

 description of the situation: '"' 



Most of the horses which brought up the train were either 

 lost, or carried home by their owners, the nature of the 

 country making it impossible to avoid this fatal incon- 

 venience, the whole being a continual forest for several 

 hundred miles without inclosures or bounds by which 

 horses can be secured: they must be turned into the woods 

 for their subsistance, and feed upon leaves and young 

 shoots of trees. Many projects, such as belts, hobles. &c., 

 were tried, but none of these were a security against the 

 wildness of the country and the knavery of the people we 

 were obliged to employ: by these means we lost our horses 

 almost as fast as we could collect them, and those which 

 remained grew very weak, so we found ourselves every day 

 less able to undertake the extra-ordinary march we were to 

 perform. 



Braddock soon appointed a Wagon Master Gen- 

 eral, and under him wagon inasters, horse masters, and 

 drovers. By his order, horses were to be mustered 

 both morning and evening. When the men made 

 camp, the wagons were to be drawn up in a single 

 line along the road, with an interval between com- 

 panies. Tlic horses were then turned into the woods 

 to feed, surrounded by a line of sentinels who were 

 not to pennit any horses to pass them. 



By June 16, when the first brigade reached Little 

 Meadows, Braddock realized that the advance of his 

 column was being retarded and his troops weakened 

 by the number of wagons in his train.'" \Vashington, 

 who had profited from his 17.S4 experiences in Pennsyl- 

 vania, previously had recommended that Braddock 

 use more pack horses and fewer wagons.'^ It became 

 obvious that wagons, while ordinarily superior to pack 

 animals, lost this advantage if the roads were not 

 sufficiently opened to admit their easy passage. In 

 view of this, Braddock decided to advance from Little 

 Meadows with a picked detachment of 1,300 men and 

 a niiniimnn of wagons, about 3(t in ntnnber. and to 



3'' Ihid., p. 313. 



'« Ibid., p. 334 (.see also Seaman's Journal, in Sargent, op. 

 ril. (footnote 2), p. 383). At times it was necessary for half 

 the troops to ground their arms and assist in moving the 

 wagons up or down grades. 



^' Douglas .S. Freeman, George Washington, vol. 1, p. 140, New 

 York, 1949. Washington had written his brother John on 

 June 14 and given his opinion that they should "retrench the 

 wagons and increase the number of bat horses." 



148 



BULLETIN 218: CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE MUSEUM OF HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY 



