leave the heavier baggage with 84 wagons in charge of 

 Colonel Dunbar and his 850 men.'* Prior to this re- 

 organization at Little Meadows, four horse teams had 

 been used in accordance with the terms of Franklin's 

 advertisements. Now, however, the advance unit of 

 the army marched with six horses to a wagon," a 

 change necessitated equally by the rugged terrain and 

 the hastily constructed roads with which they were 

 forced to contend, and by the poor condition of the 

 horses.'"' 



While this lightened column moved forward more 

 rapidly, the mountainous and rocky roads continued 

 to impede the progress of the army. On the morning 

 of June 25 so steep a grade was encountered that the 

 men were obliged to ease the carriages down with 

 tackles. Throughout the remainder of June and the 

 early part of July the column was so retarded by the 

 road conditions that only a few miles could be covered 

 each day.*' By July 4 the country had become less 

 difficult and the army was able to add a few more 

 miles to the daily march. At one o'clock on the after- 

 noon of Julv 9 this small train of wagons moved over 

 the second ford of the Monongahela between the 

 troops of the 44th and 48th regiments. A short time 

 later the unfortunate expedition met defeat for all its 

 efforts. As the battle drew to a clo.se, many of the 

 surviving troops began to gather around the wagons. 

 This drew heavier fire on the wagons and at this 

 point, said Franklin, "the waggoners took each a 

 horse out of his team and scamper'd." *' 



3' Sargent, np. cit. (footnote 2), p. 203. Wagons apparently 

 carried only artillery stores and other ammunition witli the ad- 

 vance detachment. .All provisions were carried on pack horses. 



" Ornie's Journal, in Sargent, op. cit. (footnote 2), p. 336, 



*" Ibid., p. 332. Orme said the condition of the aimy was 

 such that they could not reject any horses, a situation that was 

 used to advantage by many contractors. He refers to the 

 horses as "The offcasts of Indian traders, and scarce able to 

 stand under one hundred weight." By contract they were to 

 have carried twice that load. 



" Ibiil., pp. 342-346. On June 26, due to the "extreme 

 badness of the road," the army covered 4 miles; on June 27, 

 6 miles; June 28, 5 miles; and on June 30 pas.sage over a 

 mountain reduced the day's march to 2 miles. 



<- Walker, op. cit. (footnote 27). It is interesting to note 

 in the Waggoners' Accounts which of the teamsters appar- 

 ently took a horse and "scamper'd." On the accounts of a 

 number of them is entered the remark "to a horse returned," 

 indicating that they were first credited for the loss of wagon and 

 team, but the value of one horse was deducted in the final settle- 

 ment, the one horse having arrived safely back at Wills Creek, 

 in company, no doubt, with its anxious driver. 



As evening drew on, the wounded Braddock sent 

 Washington back to Dunbar's Camp, nearly 45 miles 

 behind, to order wagons forward with provisions and 

 hospital stores and to transport the wounded back to 

 Wills Creek. A number of these wagons met the re- 

 treating army on July 11, at Gist's Plantation; then, 

 after wounds were dressed, they returned to Dunbar's 

 Camp. There most of the wagons were gathered with 

 the stores and burned in order to keep them from the 

 hands of the eneiny. The survivors continued their 

 retreat, accompanied by a few of the wagons loaded 

 with wounded comrades. 



The number of Pennsylvania wagons that arrived 

 back at Wills Creek has not been definitely established. 

 For the service of their wagons, 30 owners received 

 payment for a period greater than the 51 days, but of 

 these, only 10 were paid for services Ijeyond what ap- 

 pears to be July 20.'" Only the wagon of William 

 Douglas, out of 146 wagons involved, .seems to have 

 survived the campaign intact.** Inasmuch as the 

 other owners were reimbursed for the loss of their 

 wagons, it is likely that those few that arrived back at 

 Fort Cumberland were so badly damaged as to render 

 them unserviceable, and therefore not worth driving 

 back to eastern Pennsylvania. 



Seven criticisms were made of Braddock's advance 

 to the forks of the Ohio. Of these seven, six, in vary- 

 ing degrees, concern transportation.'" In choosing 

 .•\lexandria to land his troops he put himself more dis- 

 tant from the needed wagons; his horses were too few 

 and too weak to bear the burden of all the supplies on 

 the entire march, withotit depots having first been es- 

 tablished at the various camps along the line of march; 

 his troops were delayed by the progress of the wagons 

 and by the necessity of their having to help with the 

 wagons; the roads were inadequate in many places for 



" \ true picture is not presented here, since the accounts, ex- 

 cept for a few cases, do not contain cither the number of days 

 for which the owners were paid or the dates of service. Only 

 the amounts paid are given, which, if broken down at 1 5 shillings 

 per day, at first would appear to indicate llie last date of senicc. 

 However, since it is not known which, if any, of these wagons 

 went to Winchester before the march, no accurate conclusions 

 can be reached. There can be little doubt that the few wagons 

 that reached Wills Creek late in July were among the 30. 



" Walker, op. cit. (footnote 27), p. 24. Douglas was not reim- 

 bursed for the loss of his wagon and was paid for an additional 

 55 days of service at a slightly reduced rate, due to the loss of 

 one horse. 



*' Freeman, op. cit. (footnote 37), vol. 2, p. 8''. 



PAPER 9: CONESTOGA WAGONS IN BRADDOCK'S CAMPAIGN, 1755 



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