at Fort George indicates that the supply situation 

 was at last reasonably good,'" but by this time the 

 season was far advanced and the forces had to retire 

 to winter quarters. Stringer was relieved of his 

 command along with Morgan early the following 

 year. Unlike that of Morgan, Stringer's dismissal 

 appears to have been based on reasonably good 

 grounds. 



Privateers to the Rescue 



Despite Gongress" slow start in providing medical 

 supplies, its members realized as early as Decemi^er 

 1775 that additional sources of supply outside the 

 Colonies would be required. On December 23 they 

 heard that £2,000 of medicines, surgeon's instruments, 

 and lint and bandages were required by the army, 

 and on January 3, 1776, the Secret Committee 

 reported to Congress that these supplies should be 

 imported as soon as possible. '** 



In September 1775 Congress had created the 

 Secret Committee to supervise the export and import 

 of vital materials required for the war. Licenses to 

 leave port were given shipmasters on the condition 

 that they w'ould return with vital military stores. 

 Under this dispensation, American ships set out for 

 Europe, Africa, and the ^Vest Indies in search of 

 essential supplies. '' Many months were required, 

 however, to establish such importation as a significant 

 source of supply, and this was especially true with 

 regard to medical supplies. 



The delay in initiating importation can hardly be 

 charged as the only or even the main reason for 

 medical supply shortages in 1776. For example, in 

 August of that year, when at least a half-dozen medi- 

 cal supply officers were pleading for drugs from Con- 

 gress in Philadelphia, John Thomson of Petersburg, 

 Virginia, advertised that he had for sale "Rhubarb 

 and Jalap, Glauber and Epsom Salts, Jesuits Bark" 

 and a host of other supplies.'"" Whether or not 

 Thomson's supplies constituted any significant amount, 

 the very fact that he had to advertise them indicates 

 a lack of coordination and communication iaetween 

 those urgently seeking supplies and those selling them. 



Even more frustrating were those suppliers right 

 under Congress's nose advertising essential drugs. 

 Suppliers like Dr. .\nthony Yeldall at "his Medicinal 



" Duncan, op. cit. (footnote 2), p. 110. 



8S Ford, op. cit. (footnote 10), vol. 3, p. 453, vol. 4, pp. 24-25. 



99 Miller, op. cit. (footnote 1), pp. 103-1 13. 



'»» Virginia Gazette, .\ugust 24, 1776. 



\\"are-Hou.se" were still advertising "Bark, Camphire, 

 Rhubarb, &c" in July of '76."" Philadelphia was 

 .second only to Xcw York for Loyalists, and Yeldall 

 was later proven to be a strong Tory. Then there 

 were those who were neither Patriot nor Loyalist; 

 they were just indifferent to the cau.se for .\mcrican 

 independence, and thus insisted on cash, even though 

 six months' credit was the common practice just prior 

 to the war. In 1771 in Philadelphia one druggist 

 regularly gave a 15 percent discount on all purchases 

 if paid within six months and ?){ percent discount 

 was allowed for payments between six and nine 

 months, but interest was expected on all debts over 

 a year's standing. '"^ 



The business-minded members of Congress tried to 

 follow prewar methods by seeking credit. Merchants 

 who sold on credit found that, when they finally were 

 paid, they received paper money backed only by a 

 promise to exchange for gold and silver at some future 

 time. Furthermore, they were caught in a spiraling 

 inflation, and often found that when they finally 

 received their money from Congress it then would 

 cost them twice as much to replenish their stocks. 

 Medical supply officers therefore found it necessary 

 to pay ready cash for merchandise out of their own 

 pocket, and sometimes they had to wait six months 

 for reimbursement from Congress. 



.\s we have noted, by the fall of 1776 Boston had 

 become a better source of supply of drugs than Phila- 

 delphia, although it had been occupied by the British 

 for nine months and Morgan had removed most of 

 the drugs left there the previous May. This was 

 primarily due to a single factor — the American priva- 

 teer. British shipping was vulnerable to the Ameri- 

 can privateers, which were fast vessels well suited to 

 this kind of enterprise. Well over 1,000 captures 

 were made during the war by Massachusetts privateers 

 alone, and the arrivals of rich prize ships at New 

 England ports became frequent.'"^ 



The Greenleaf ledger confirms that drugs were 

 included in some of these prize ships. On December 

 14. 1776, Greenleaf records the receipt of £62 from 

 the Massachusetts government in payment for "an 

 invoice of Druggs taken from the prize ship Julius 

 Caesar." Greenleaf received an even larger stock 

 "of druggs taken in the prize Brig Three Friends" in 



101 Pennsylvania Evening Post, Ju\y 18, 1776. 



i»2 G. B. Griffenhagcn, ■•The Day-Dunlap 1771 Pharmaceu- 

 tical Catalogue," .American Journal oj Pharmacy, 1955, vol. 127, 

 pp. 296-302. 



103 Miller, op. cit. (footnote 1), pp. 110-112. 



PAPER 16: DRUG SUPPLIES IN THE .AMERICAN REVOLUTION 



121 



