month. Added to lliis delay v\as the lime consumed 

 1)\- the writing of letters and getting them aboard 

 ship, and by the slowness of the King and his ministers 

 in coming to a decision in England — particularly 

 when the monarch was enjoying the pleasures of 

 Newmarket. Consequently, six months often elapsed 

 before answers to burning questions were forthcoming. 



The royal decisions concerning the rebellion were 

 made directly by the King and his closest advisers on 

 the Committee for Foreign Affairs, not by the Com- 

 mittee for Trade and Plantations or by the Privy 

 Council. The documents at Longleat (the estate of 

 the Marquis of Bath in Wiltshire), which contain 

 Secretary of State Henry Coventry's minute.s of the 

 meetings of the Committee for Foreign Affairs, com- 

 monly known as the "cabinet council," demonstrate 

 conclusively that all vital decisions concerning the 

 rebellion were made by this informal group of top 

 advisers. The Privy Council and the Lords Com- 

 mittee for Trade and Plantations tended to be agencies 

 that gave their stamp of approval to policy already 

 decided.'' The exact composition of the cabinet coun- 

 cil is uncertain, but no doubt it changed from time to 

 time. During the period of Bacon's Rebellion this 

 council probably included the King; the Duke of 

 York; Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby, the Lord 

 Treasurer, then assuming a new and more powerful 

 role;'' Sir Heneage Finch, the Lord Chancellor; and 

 either or both of the Secretaries of State, Cloventry and 

 VVilliaiTison. 



At the meetings of the King and his close advi.sers, 

 which often took place on Sunday, pertinent informa- 



» Wilcomb E. Washburn, "Bacons Rebellion, 1676-1677, •' 

 Harvard University, doctoral dissertation, 1955, ch. 7; Long- 

 leat, vols. 77, 78, passim. 



' Stephen B. Baxter, The Development of the Treasury, 1660-1702, 

 Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957, pp. 262-263. We are in- 

 debted to Andrew Browning's Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby 

 and Duke of Leeds, 1632-7772 {Glasgow, 1944-1951, 3 vols.) for de- 

 tailed knowledge of the powerful role played by Danby. That 

 the members of the cabinet council varied in number at this 

 time is indicated by the statement of .Secretary of State Henry 

 Coventry to John, Lord Berkeley, Sir William's brother, De- 

 cember 26, 1676, that "The Truth is either Sickness, busyness 

 or Devotion have made the Meetings of the Ccmmittee of for- 

 reigne Affairs so rare, and those that Compose it so few, that 

 I have not had the opportunity of speaking to the King, and 

 the Lord Treasurer together since the writing my last to your 

 Excellency" (Letter-Book of Coventry, British Museum, Addi- 

 tional MS. 25119, p. 75, quoted in Edward Raymond Turner, 

 Till Cabinet Council of England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 

 Centuries, 7622-1784, Baltimore, 1927 1928, vol. 1, p. 70). 



lion received from Virginia by Secretary of State 

 Coventry would be presented. Unfortunately — prin- 

 cipally through the instrumentality of Giles Bland, the 

 King's collector of customs in Virginia, who had the 

 last viewing of all ships leaving the colony — too few 

 letters were received from the loyalists and too many 

 from Bacon's supporters. The King and his council 

 also considered letters and petitions from the three 

 Virginia agents in England: Francis Moryson, Thomas 

 Ludwell, and Robert Smith. These men had been 

 sent by the colony to obtain a new charter guarantee- 

 ing land titles and personal liberties of the settlers 

 against infringement by grants that the King had 

 carelessly made to some of his court favorites. The 

 Crown did not ignore these representatives. Moryson 

 was once even commanded to present his views and 

 those of his fellow agents directly to the King.* 



Early in July of 1676 King Charles II decided to send 

 300 troops to \'irginia. This decision was partly 

 taken on the advice of the Virginia agents who had 

 informed him that 300 would be a sufficient number 

 of soldiers to put down the rebellion while more would 

 be burdensome to the country. When the agents 

 belatedly discovered that the King intended the 

 colony to be responsible for supporting the soldiers, 

 they boldly as.serted that the charge would be "in- 

 supportable" and that they had no power to commit 

 the colony to any such obligation. They begged the 

 King to defer his decision until he had heard the 

 opinion of the Virginia Assembly. When later in the 

 summer news of the rebellion became w'orse and 

 Charles II again made plans to send troops, the 

 agents, who were by that time plunged in gloom, 

 urged him to wait until more troops could be raised. 

 By November, when about 1,000 troops finally did 

 leave England bound for \'irginia, they were too 

 manv and too late.'' 



* Francis Moryson to "My Lord," September 7, 1676, Long- 

 leat, vol. 77, folio 208. 



9 Henry Coventry draft letter, July 10, 16^6, Longleat, vol. 

 91, folio 17; notes taken at the July 12 and July 13, 1676, meet- 

 ings of the "Committee of Forreign Affairs," ibid., vol. 77, 

 folios 150, 152; Henry Coventry, "Heads of dispatches for 

 Virginia," August 22, 1676, ibid., folios 187-191, 297-298; 

 memorandum endorsed "Instructions Gis'en at the Committee 

 for Forrain Affaires September 1, 1676 Concerning Virginia," 

 ihid., folios 195-196; Francis Moryson to "My Lord," ibid., 

 folio 208; "Particulars to be considered in the dispatch of Sir 

 John Berry to Virginia," October 3, 1676, Pepys Papers, 

 Rawlinson MSS., Class .\, vol. 185, folios 259-260, Bodleian 



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BULLETIN 22 S: CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE MUSEUM OF HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY 



