226 ON THE RELATION OF THE 



and emeiKlatioii of tlie tests trausmitted to us, and witli the history of 

 literature and art, require an intuitive i)erception of the sense of an 

 author and of the secondary meaning of his words ; they require a correct 

 appreciation, both of the individuality of the author and of the genius 

 of the hmguage in which he wrote. All these are instances of artistic 

 and not of logical induction. We can ouly form our judgment, if a 

 large number of similar facts is ready in tbe memory to be quickly 

 brought into relation with the question before us. One of the first 

 requirements for this kind of studies is, therefore, a reliable and ready 

 memory. Indeed, many celebrated historians and philologists have ex- 

 cited the astonishment of their contemporaries by the power of their 

 memories. Of course, the mere memory would not suffice without the fac- 

 ulty of quickly perceiving analogies, or without a finely developed appre- 

 ciation of human emotions ; and this latter requisite cannot, perhaps, be 

 acquired without a certain warmth of feeling or an interest in observing 

 the emotions of others. While our intercourse with our fellow-men in 

 every-day life must furnish the basis for these psychological reflections, 

 the study of history and art serves to sui)plement and enrich them, since 

 both show us men acting under unusual circumstances, and teach uS 

 the whole extent of the powers that lie slumbering in our bosoms. 



The above-mentioned sciences, with the exception of grammar^ gen- 

 erally do not succeed in obtaining strict universal laws. The laws of 

 grammar are established by the human will, although it may have been 

 unconsciously and without a premeditated plan, but developing as the 

 need of them was felt. They appear, therefore, to the learner of the 

 language as laws established by extraneous authority. 



Intimately connected with philology are theology and jurisprurlence, 

 whose preparatory and auxiliary studies in fact belong to the circle of 

 philological sciences. The general laws, which we find in both, are also 

 such as have been established by extraneous authority for our belief 

 and mode of action as regarded from a moral or judicial point of view, 

 and not laws like those of nature, Miiich state the generalization of a 

 mass of facts. Like the application of a law of nature, however, to a 

 particular case, the ai)plication of a grammatical, legal, moral, or dogmat- 

 ical rule, is made in the form of a conscious logical syllogism. The 

 rule forms the major premise, and the minor ju'cmise must show 

 whether the case in point fulfills the requirements of the rule. The 

 solution of this latter process, as well in grammatical analysis for 

 explaining the sense of a sentence as in a legal consideration of the 

 truth of facts, the intentions of agents or the sense of their writings 

 mustajrain be of a psychological nature. We cannot deny, however, 

 that both the syntax of civilized languages and the system of our juris- 

 prudence, perfected by a practice of more than 2,000 years, have at- 

 tained so high a degree of logical finish and consistency that cases not 

 coming clearly under their laws are exceptional. Of course, there will 

 always be such cases, because human laws can never hope to become as 



