182 ANNUAL REPORT SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, 1955 



applied research to take steps to avoid duplication — since for two 

 groups to be assigned the problem of developing the same weapon is 

 usually less efficient than for them to combine forces. Also, since 

 applied military research is usually necessarily secret, it is important 

 to establish coordinating mechanisms to avoid the waste of unknow- 

 ingly repeating what another laboratory has done. 



For these and many other reasons it is important, when talking 

 about government activities in science, to distinguish sharply be- 

 tween pure and applied science. What is good for one may not be 

 good for the other. 



Now it is not surprising to note that the military services a,nd the 

 AEC have developed not one but many patterns for carrying on 

 applied research. A democracy never does anything in a unified or 

 monolithic way. This is both our strength and our danger. The 

 strength is that diversity of approach and individuality are conducive 

 to new ideas. The danger is that resources will be scattered and in- 

 effective, policies will be confused, and high priority tasks will be 

 neglected. 



In applied research, as in basic research, it is not necessarily efficient 

 to have it all under a single management. But to an extent not de- 

 sirable in basic research, applied military research must be under 

 relatively few agencies, and they must be closely coordinated to avoid 

 wasteful repetition. Thus, for example, it is quite proper that the 

 direction of all military development has not been consolidated under 

 one office in the Department of Defense. But it is proper also that 

 there has been created there one office to give guidance and coordina- 

 tion to all the service agencies. 



It is also not surprising to find the research pattern different in the 

 three services — nor is this disturbing. Yet each service needs one office 

 which gives rather close attention to the supervision of the whole pro- 

 gram of that service. Also each service needs an effective mechanism 

 for keeping new developments closely tied to plans — to requirements — 

 to logistics — to tactical development. This is probably the area in 

 which there is greatest weakness. New weapons are often produced 

 in ignorance of tactical requirements; they are introduced without 

 adequate study of their tactical possibilities, without adequate logistics 

 and maintenance and training. Military plans, on the other hand, 

 are sometimes drawn up without taking into account new weapons 

 that will shortly be available. There is, in short, inadequate atten- 

 tion given to clarifying the goals of the military research program 

 and making clear to every agency its part and purpose in the program. 



There are many people aware of these shortcomings, and many in 

 the military establishment are trying to remedy them. It is not my 

 task today — or any day — to tell them how to do the job. We certainly 

 do wish them success. 



