186 ANNUAL REPORT SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, 1955 



We must, however, keep in mind that there are many types of 

 so-called "research and development" enterprises under the military 

 services, and eacli kind carries its own set of special circumstances, 

 its own problems and restrictions. For example, if a new fighter 

 aircraft is needed the only possible mechanism to obtain it is through 

 a development contract with an aircraft company. No one thinks of 

 any other scheme. On the other hand, if one needs a testing facility 

 whose prime function is to test and evaluate many different kinds of 

 ordnance equipment, say, and to evaluate their military usefulness, 

 then a military establisliment would appear to be appropriate. For 

 the wide range of activities in between these on the one hand, and the 

 pure research projects on the other, there is a range of choice of 

 methods of operation. If one is starting from scratch he will, of 

 course, if possible, choose a modus operandi which has the highest 

 probability of success for that operation. The objective must always 

 be to find a mechanism which is appropriate to the task and which 

 has the greatest probability of developing and encouraging the cre- 

 ative spirit of research, and bringing that spirit to bear on the specific 

 military problem at hand. An able team, ably led, which under- 

 stands where it is going and why, will surely get there. 



This brings me to a problem which I think neither scientists nor 

 the military agencies have solved, namely, the problem of trying, at 

 every stage in the development and use of new weapons, to bring 

 together scientific and military experience. Every time an intensive 

 effort has been made to do this in a particular area the results have 

 been most fruitful — sometimes spectacularly so. I think of the 

 Hartwell project, for example. But this should be a continuous 

 process. It seems to me that it is the responsibility of every scientist 

 and engineer who is working in a laboratory devoted to military 

 purposes to keep himself continuously informed of the Nation's 

 broad military problems and of the specific ones in his area. If he is 

 working on a radar he should inform himself fully of the military 

 situations in which it is to be or could be used. If he is working on 

 a missile he should know what it is for, what other equipment it will 

 be used with, what military problems it is intended to solve. A 

 weapon designed in the dark, no matter how technically clever it is, 

 may be of little or no military utility. 



Conversely, of course, the military agencies have a responsibility. 

 A weapon dreamed up as desirable by a soldier who is without access 

 to knowledge about technological possibilities may also be a dud — or 

 at least less effective than it could be. The point is that military and 

 scientific people should do their dreaming together. They should be 

 continually exchanging ideas about defense problems. The scientist 

 may then hear of military situations he did not know existed — and 



