HENRI POINCARE NORDMANN. 761 



Those who, in tlie name of Poincare, have proclaimed anew the 

 failure of science have not understood liim. Otherwise they would 

 have seen that he battered down only a certain interpretation of 

 science made by men who chd not know it at all. The attitude of 

 Poincare has notliing in common with that of tlie men of the rank 

 and file whose agnosticism ill conceals their ignorance and upon 

 whom he sometimes hked to use liis indulgent irony. ''It is not 

 enough to doubt indiscriminately; we must know why we doubt." 



The fragile nature of scientific theories proves nothing against 

 science; they are only show cases, shop windows, frames wherein we 

 arrange more or less conveniently our treasures. It is just the same 

 as when for our world's fairs we gather together all the most marvel- 

 ous products of our industries in ephemeral palaces built of mill 

 boards but of the most brilliant designs; and then because the wind 

 and the rain demolish these structures of boards, if we try to keep 

 them too long, or because we demolish them ourselves to build again 

 others yet differently to expose anew our products, who would dare 

 to say that our human industries had failed? But that is just the 

 way these men reason, who, may I so call them, are the perpetual 

 assignees of the failure of science. Is it not just as a blind man 

 would reason if it occurred to him to disparage the light of the stars 'i 



But, side by side of these simple and ingenuous detractors, there 

 has recently arisen a new class which criticizes and diminishes the 

 value of science; they uphold a body of doctrine due to a very intel- 

 ligent, educated, subtle set of men who belong more or less to the 

 new school of pragmatic philosophy. The}'^ pretend to draw argu- 

 ments from the ideas of Poincare. What would he think of them? 



Wliat gives pragmatism its absorbing interest is that while not 

 ignoring science, arguing indeed from its results, it appeals to other 

 criteria than reason. But this is not the time to examine these 

 doctrines. In order to know what Poincare himself thought of 

 them let us ask him. There at once arises an essential antinomy. 

 The aim of pragmatism, whence its name, is action, practical service, 

 and if science has a value it is as a means of action and because it 

 furnishes us with practical and useful rules. To Poincare, on the 

 other hand, it is knowledge which is the end of action. If he was 

 glad of industrial development, it was not only because it furnished a 

 I'eady argument to the defendei's of science, but also because, by 

 freeing men more and more from material cares, it would some day 

 give to all the leisure to work for science. 



This point of view is not only full of nobleness and beauty, it is 

 indeed richer in useful consequences than utihtarian pragmatism 

 itself. For a century and a half the pragmatists as well as the posi- 

 tivists (how can we refrain from wondering at the strange bond 

 which unites two such different schools ?) looked upon the discoveries 



