NEW AGE OF THE SEA — TEAGER 383 



man are putting an unprecedented premium on national security. 

 At the same time, it is apparent that today, more than ever, strength 

 is crucial from a psychological as well as from a physical standpoint. 



Since tlie channel to security through international comity and 

 negotiation cannot be depended upon, either now or in the foreseeable 

 future, a strong military posture is the alternative. There is very 

 little disagreement about this. Wliat is strange is the fact that our 

 technological revolution, while introducing radical new concepts of 

 weapons and weapon systems, actually tends to accentuate the ancient 

 role of the sea as a theater of military activity. 



One does not need to be a military expert to see that this is so. In 

 fact, not being an expert has its advantages. For if one is not, it is 

 possible to evaluate the meaning of our new technology without being 

 overly influenced by tradition, pride, ambition, or economic security. 



To the nonmilitary expert, who is, however, familiar with the vari- 

 ous military and civilian views concerning the employment of modern 

 science in national defense, it is clear that current technolog}'' is mider- 

 lining the necessity for mobility and secrecy of operational bases. And 

 this is where the finger of logic points squarely to the sea. 



No doubt it is true, as many of our military men assert, that we 

 are moving inevitably into a time of astropower. But it is equally 

 true that for many years to come the most efficient operational bases 

 for asserting such power will be located on earth. And even when 

 bases in space become possible, their vulnerability from the standpoint 

 of mobility and secrecy will scarcely be less than bases functioning on 

 or below the surface of the sea. Paradoxically, the missile-space era 

 itself seems destined to emphasize this salt-water utility. 



Since the refinement of the missile, target accuracy has become un- 

 comfortably high. With the addition of the nuclear warhead, its 

 threat obviously is a devastating one. As soon as geodetic surveys 

 have been perfected and geographical locations are precisely known, 

 as soon as missile production and servicing become simplified and re- 

 liable, the risks we face will prove less and less tolerable and land 

 bases more and more vulnerable. Even the so-called "hard" launch- 

 ing sites — those constructed undergroimd — may find their effectiveness 

 partially canceled, particularly if the enemy is capable of contaminat- 

 ing the surrounding area with a hovering lid of deadly radiation or 

 destructive chemical or biological agents. 



Mobility and secrecy, at this point in time, will cease to be marginal 

 necessities. They will be absolute ones. They may be obtainable on 

 land by such schemes as the mobile-transport Minuteman. They will 

 also be easily and efficiently attained at sea. 



It appears likely, then, that an increasing percentage of U.S. deter- 

 rent power will shift to the sea. This may include more than the 



