SATELLITE-TRACKING PROGRAM — ^HAYES 335 



tioii between Cambridge and Moscow, in addition to the regular 

 CSAGI world-warning system. 



Late in July, Dr. Whipple wrote to Dr. Joseph Kaplan, chaimian 

 for the U.S. National Committee for the IGY, a letter concerning the 

 acquisition, optical tracking, and data analysis of U.S.S.R. satellites 

 that might be launched during the IGY. Dr. Whipple felt that 

 serious consideration should bo given to the establislunent of addi- 

 tional Moon watch teams at higher latitudes, possibly to 65° north 

 and south, and ultimately to the possibility of expanding the Baker- 

 Nunn camera to 20 network stations. He made clear that these 

 prospects had been in the minds of the Smithsonian staff for some 

 months and involved such further matters as additional computa- 

 tional requirements, public relations problems, the obtaining of pre- 

 liminary orbital data, and above all the question of how the Observa- 

 tory should fund the tracking of satellites not lamiched by the United 

 States. There was clear agreement on the part of the Observatory 

 staff' that the nature of the Smithsonian charter involved an obliga- 

 tion that it track any and all satellites and issue the results of such 

 efforts to the public and to the scientific community. 



Meanwhile, the Russians had made it perfectly evident that they 

 hoped and planned to launch a satellite before the United States did. 

 The IGY satellites were supposed to broadcast on a frequency of 108 

 megacycles. The Russians announced, however, through the pages 

 of their journal Radio that their satellites would broadcast on 20 and 

 40 me. in order to permit the flight of certain basic experiments and 

 the telemetering of data to ground stations. Most U.S. agencies paid 

 no attention whatsoever to these announcements, so that when Sput- 

 nik I was launched there was not a single radio-tracking system in the 

 United States able to monitor the satellite. In the words of one 

 rather bitter critic, the United States was "caught with its antennas 

 down." 



The only optical tracking facilities available m the United States 

 on October 4, 1957, were those of the Smithsonian Astrophysical 

 Observatory. As a consequence, the Observatory had to undertake 

 immediately an optical tracking program that involved locating and 

 following the satellite, issuing predictions, and similar activities not 

 fully provided for under the IGY grants to the Observatory. This 

 necessity put a heavy strain on the budget, particularly for personnel. 

 The scientists who promptly and willingly undertook to process the 

 data that resulted from the early Moonwatch tracking had to carry 

 on for a number of weeks without positive assurance of additional 

 fmiding and witliout precise assignment of responsibilities. 



On October 9 the U.S. National Committee for the IGY did issue 

 a memorandum on Sx^utnik I. Under the heading of Tracking Data, 



