SATELLITE-TRACKING PROGRAM — HAYES 337 



A year later, when Dr. Wliipple was in Russia, lie and a few other 

 American scientists visited the exposition of agriculture and mechan- 

 ical arts to inspect the model of the satellite that was there on display. 

 He confirmed certain physical measurements and other features of 

 the satellite. Up to that time the Russian scientists still had not 

 provided such fundamental data as the mean cross-sectional area of 

 the satellite. 



On November 3 the Russians launched their second satellite, 1957 

 Beta, carrying instruments to detect cosmic-ray, ultraviolet, and X-ray 

 radiation, and an 11-pound dog that died after approximately 100 

 hours at zero gravity. Transmitters and power supply were similar 

 to those on board Sputnik I. Its perigee was 140 miles, apogee 104 

 miles, inclination to the equator 65.4°, and its speed 18,000 miles per 

 hour at perigee, and 15,000 miles per hour at apogee. The satellite 

 re-entered the atmosphere and decayed on April 13, 1958. 



PRESS AND PUBLIC 



The public reaction to Sputnik I was, in the words of Dr. Hynek, 

 "a strange mixture of awe, admiration, and fear, the last enhanced, 

 of course, because there had been no warning." In those early days 

 people wrote thousands of letters, made hundreds of telephone calls, 

 to the Observatory. A few were frankly incredulous; they simply 

 refused to believe that the Russians had the teclmical capability to 

 launch an artificial satellite when the United States had not yet done 

 so. Others were openly fearful ; they believed that Sputnik I carried 

 either atom bombs to destroy the United States or television cameras 

 to spy on her. Not a few felt that the scientist was once again med- 

 dling in cosmic affairs that were not his business ; their arguments over- 

 looked the fact that man had already profoundly modified his natural 

 environment and would inevitably continue to do so. Then there were 

 the angry ones, who were ready and willing to blame everyone in the 

 Federal Government from President Eisenhower to the obscurest 

 technician in a laboratory for the failure of the United States to beat 

 the Russians into space. Finally, and these were the most numerous, 

 there were those who simply wanted to know ; they offered hundreds 

 of questions for answer: What exactly was the orbit of Sputnik I? 

 How had it been launched ? "^Vliat instruments did it carry ? How 

 long could it be expected to stay up ? Many of these inquiries were 

 from children eager to learn, reflecting a youthful concern for things 

 scientific that was in itself a credit to American education and would 

 provide the materials for the quickening of the American school sys- 

 tem in response to the challenge of Sputnik I. 



Both AVliipple and Hynek had a profound conviction that the people 

 were entitled to know everything. It was their policy from the be- 



