356 ANNUAL REPORT SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, 19 63 



historically memorable Special Keport No, 15 on the demise of 

 Sputnik II. 



By the end of 1957, the initial orbit determination program of 

 Slowey and Briggs had been completed, debugged, and was being 

 used to generate orbits. A loading routine had been written to per- 

 mit observations to be read directly into tlie computer in the form 

 in which they were received, with reduction being done internally and 

 automatically. Another addition to the program was the inclusion 

 of a routine to find suitable starting values for the topocentric dis- 

 tances that the program used to obtain correct orbits. On December 

 28 Mr. Slowey presented a general description of the method and 

 program to a meeting of the American Astronomical Society in 

 Indianapolis, Ind. It was estimated that the program was at least 

 90 percent effective in producing orbits from sets of observations 

 chosen at random. 



By the end of the year, 1,956 observations of Satellite 1957 a 1, 43 

 dubious observations of 1957 a 2, and 494 observations of 1957 Beta 

 had been processed. 



A master list of station coordinates, including the identification 

 number and the height of the station above sea level, had been com- 

 piled in a form that could be used as input for the IBM-704 com- 

 puter. Included in this list were all registered Moonwatch teams, 

 selected American and foreign observatories, and a number of 

 miscellaneous observers. 



Predictions were by this time essentially of two types; the first 

 consisted of an ephemeris giving the time and longitude of all cross- 

 ings of the 40th parallel; these were distributed to the press, to obser- 

 vation teams throughout the world, and to interested individuals and 

 agencies. The second consisted of an ephemeris giving more detailed 

 and specific information for special observation teams such as Moon- 

 watch. Both ephemerides were programed for the IBM-704 

 computer. 



PROJECT VANGUARD 



Meanwhile the American public had been clamoring for a U.S. 

 satellite, to challenge the dramatic successes of the Soviet space pro- 

 gram. Seemingly the only possibility for a launching lay with Proj- 

 ect Vanguard, since it was the one official satellite program for the 

 IG Y ; no alternative was being developed. 



While the public was impatient, the directors of Vanguard were 

 proceeding with necessary and commendable caution. They had de- 

 fined the project as "a complete system for space exploration," for it 

 included not only the design, manufacture, test, and launch of the 

 rocket and its payload but also the development of launch, tracking 

 computation, and other operational facilities. 



