TIME-KEEPIXG IN GREECE AND ROME. 379 



by the same multiplication, it may fairly be asked whether the accuracy 

 with which time is observed in ordinary life, may not after all aftord one 

 of the most perfect indications of the social condition of a people. 



The material is not gathered for a full discussion of a question like 

 this, aiul 1 shall not occupy myself with it, but as incidental to and sug- 

 gested by the topic I have chosen, some light seems to be thrown on it 

 by the attempt to place in their true correlation facts of history not 

 hitherto brought together. I have proposed to myself only a study of 

 the growth of the common clock, noting the various steps in its devel- 

 opment with reference to their period in history, and to the social condi- 

 tions which inspired or demanded them, as well as to the state of science 

 and mechanic arts which made their consummation possible. The sub- 

 ject is too large for a single paper, and I have therefore taken for pres- 

 ent consideration that part which relates to time keeping among the 

 ancient peoples from whom we chietiy derive our civilization and to a 

 period of history which, by a sort of coincidence, practically terminates 

 with the beginning our of era. My guide in this inquiry will be the prin- 

 ciples in eurematics that inventions always spring from prior inventions 

 or known expedients, and that they come iu response to recognized 

 wants. It need not be repeated that these principles find copious illus- 

 trations In the progress of every art ; but the truth can not be too 

 strongly enforced that the progress of no art can be intelligently studied 

 or thoroughly comprehended without keeping them in mind. 



The few barren and isolated facts that have been preserved to us re- 

 garding time-keeping prior to about six hnndred years ago are not 

 enongh in themselves, however carefully collated, to constitute an in- 

 telligible or consecutive history. But 1 need not say that no event is 

 in fact isolated from all others iu cause and effect ; and if we can not 

 have direct light we may look to the concurrent events of history for 

 side lights upon our meager facts w^hich will perhaps throw them into 

 stronger relief than the direct narration of unphilosophical historians. 

 Hence, if T shall seem to anj' one to lean too much upon the synchronisms 

 and sequences of history, it is not that I do not realize the possible fal- 

 laciousness of an argument which has no other foundation ; but in the 

 progress of inventions such sequences are to be sought for. Invention 

 responds to want, and the want may originate in some crisis or event 

 having no apparent affinity in character with the want it engendered or 

 the invention that sprang to meet it. And these are not mere accidents ; 

 they are the natural course of what I venture to call the hxed laws of 

 eurematics. At the same time these laws do not necessarily always call 

 for original invention, since importation of an invention already known 

 elsewheremay ecpially sui)ply the want, and historical crises are as likely 

 to lead to importation, where it is possible, as to invention. It is with 

 these principles in view, and always looking for such side light as con- 

 temporary events can give, that 1 have attemi)ted to franie the consec- 

 utive history of time keeping, of which this paper is a part. 



