398 ANNUAL REPORT SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, 1962 



submarines. With their demonstrated interest in the Arctic com- 

 mercially, scientifically, and strategically, the Soviets can be expected 

 to direct their nuclear submarines north and under the ice. 



The advantage to be gained by naval forces operating imder the 

 northern ice is fairly obvious. First, such a submarine force is secure 

 from their traditional surface and air enemies. Second, ship targets 

 in this area are especially valuable since there are few if any overland 

 roads or rails to support the area, and air transport is practicable only 

 to a limited extent. The sinking of a very few ships could cause whole 

 areas to wither from lack of supplies. Third, the Arctic Ocean oc- 

 cupies a strategic position second to none. The search for missile- 

 launching points clearly marks the Arctic Ocean as ideal for targets 

 both in North America and Eurasia. The development of the Polaris 

 submarine and its Soviet equivalent is bound to increase the desirabil- 

 ity of operating submarines in the Arctic. 



Beyond the three direct considerations is a subtle fourth considera- 

 tion of great importance. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United 

 States could possibly accept the establishment of an unfriendly Arctic 

 nuclear submarine force without establishing a similar force. A 

 nuclear submarine will be the only weapon able to counter a nuclear 

 submarine under the Arctic ice in the foreseeable future. 



The nuclear submarine is not per se an Arctic ship of war. It must 

 be specially equipped, trained, and provided with information and 

 procedures for offensive Arctic operations. The voyages of Nautilus^ 

 Skate, Sargo, and Seadragon have been nonmilitary in nature. Much 

 remains to be done before nuclear submarines are ready for offensive 

 naval operations in the Arctic. The equipment and environmental 

 information already obtamed by these submarines is a broad base to 

 build on. The conclusion that their efforts have placed the United 

 States several years in the lead because of voyages over a period of 

 3 years is not valid, however. The voyages so far accomplished have 

 been widely spaced. Any determined opponent having several nuclear 

 submarines and the published knowledge of these voyages could 

 duplicate and exceed them quickly. It is possible to produce an Arctic 

 naval force equal to that of the United States in a relatively short 

 period of time. 



History may well mark this period as a time of utmost significance 

 in the Arctic. If accelerated naval penetration of this area does not 

 result, it will be only because the challenge and opportunities that 

 exist were iimored. 



