1891.] on f lie Imjylications of Science. 433 



about the past. It is quite certain we may and do make such mis- 

 takes. But nevertheless we are all of us certain as to some past 

 events. Probably there is no single person now in this room, who is 

 not certain that he was somewhere else before he entered it. Memory 

 informs us — certainly it informs me — as surely concerning some 

 portions of the past, as consciousness does concerning some portions 

 of the present. 



If we could not trust our faculty of memory, the whole of 

 physical science would be, for us, a mere present dream. But there 

 can be no such thing as proof of the trustworthiness of memory, 

 since no argument is possible without trusting to the veracity of 

 memory. It is therefore a fundamental fact which must be taken on 

 its own evidence and from a consideration of the results of any real 

 doubts about it : results I will refer to presently. 



Yet it has been strangely declared, by a leading agnostic, that we 

 may trust our memory because we learn its trustworthiness by ex- 

 perience. Surely never was fallacy more obvious ! How could we ever 

 gain experience if we did not trust memory in gaining it ? Particular 

 acts of memory may, of course, be confirmed by experience if the 

 faculty of memory be already trusted, but in every such instance it 

 must be confided in. The agnostic referred to has told us in effect 

 that we may place confidence in our present memory, because in past 

 instances its truth has been experimentally confirmed, while we can 

 only know it has been so confirmed, by trusting our present memory ! 



But if we admit the trustworthiness of memory at all, a most 

 important consequence follows — one relating to the distinction 

 between what is subjective and what is objective. Every feelinc' or 

 state of consciousness present to the mind of the subject who jjossesses 

 it is subjective, and the whole of such experiences taken together con- 

 stitute the sphere of subjectivity. Whatever is external to our present 

 consciousness or feeling is for us objective, and all that is thus 

 external is the region of objectivity. Now memory, inasmuch as it 

 reveals to us part of our own past, reveals to us what is objective, 

 and so introduces us into the realm of objectivity, shows us more or 

 less of objective truth, and carries us into a real world which is 

 beyond the range of our own present feelings. This progress, then 

 — this knowledge of objectivity — is, through memory, implied in 

 every scientific experiment the facts of which we regard as certain. 



But our scientific observations and experiments carry with them 

 yet another implication more important still : this is the certainty of 

 our knowledge of our own continuous existence. Unless we can be 

 sure that we actually made those observations and experiments on 

 our having made which we rely for our conclusions, how can those 

 conclusions be confidently relied on by us ? 



This implication is so important — in my opinion so fundamentally 

 important — that I must crave your permission to notice it, later on, 

 at some length. But before considering it, I desire to call your 

 attention to the fact that the propositions thus implied by physical 



