438 Dr. St. George Mivart [June 5, 



all reasoning addressed to others be thus vain, the silent reasoning of 

 solitary discursive thought must be vain also. Yet what does this 

 amount to, save an utter paralysis of the intellect. It is scepticism 

 run mad. 



But the implication I regard as one of the most important of all, 

 is the implication of our knowledge of our own continuous existence, 

 concerning which I said I must crave your permission to speak at 

 some length. It was the mention of this implication which led me 

 to refer to that system of thought it is my object here to controvert. 



I have heard it proclaimed in this theatre by Professor Huxley, 

 that we cannot have supreme certainty as to our own continuous 

 existence, and that such knowledge is but secondary and subordinate 

 to our knowledge of our present feelings or " states of consciousness." 



Of course I am not thus accusing him of originating any such 

 erroneous views. In that matter he is but a follower of that daring 

 and playful philosopher Hume. I say " playful," because I cannot 

 myself think that he really believed his own negations. He seems 

 to me too acute a man to have been himself their dupe. But, how- 

 ever this may be, I here venture directly to contradict Hume's and 

 Professor Huxley's affirmation, which is also adopted by Mr. Herbert 

 Spencer, and to affirm that we have the highest certainty as to our 

 own continuous existence. 



It is, of course, quite true that we have complete certainty about 

 our present feelings, as also that we cannot know ourselves apart 

 from our feelings ; but it is no less true that we cannot be conscious 

 of feelings apart from the " self " which has those feelings. Now it is 

 assumed by those I oppose that we can know nothing with complete 

 certainty, unless we know it by itself or unmodified, or as existing 

 absolutely. But in fact nothing, so far as we know, exists apart 

 from every other entity and unmodified, or " absolutely," as it is, in my 

 opinion, absurdly called. No wonder then if we do not know things 

 in a way in which they never do, and probably never can, exist. 

 We really know nothing by itself, because nothing exists by 

 itself. It is not wonderful, then, if we only know ourselves as related 

 to our simultaneously known feelings, or vice versa. It is quite true 

 that we never know our own substantial essential being alone and 

 unmodified ; but then we have never for an instant so existed. Our 

 knowledge of ourselves in this respect is like our knowledge of any- 

 body and everybody else. Most persons here present doubtless know 

 Professor Tyndall ; yet they never knew him (no one ever knew him) 

 except in some state — either at home or away from home, either 

 sitting or not sitting, either in motion or at rest, either with his head 

 covered or uncovered — and this for the very good and obvious reason 

 that he never did or could exist for a moment save in some state. But 

 this does not prevent your knowing him very well, and the same 

 consideration applies to our knowledge of ourselves. When I consider 

 what is my primary, direct consciousness at any moment, I find it to 

 be neither a consciousness of a state of feeling, nor of my continuous 



