110 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 



It has already been said that the practical man is concerned chiefly 

 with the product, which he takes roughly for granted without too much 

 curiosity as to its origin ; but he is intensely interested in its uses, what- 

 ever they may be. He does not reflect upon even this circumstance, 

 however, proceeding in his pragmatic way to do the work in hand. 

 When therefore he speaks of <£wris it is generally some aspect of nature 

 as it is that he has in view. From this attitude springs the common 

 usage of philosophical and quasi-philosophical circles, which regards 

 chiefly things as things, without too much implication of further ques- 

 tionings. In so far as there is a suggestion of further questions, they 

 concern the "constitution" of the thing — that is, "what it is" ex- 

 pressed in terms of "what it is made of." This is the regular sense 

 of the phrase -rrepl ^vo-ews as applied in titles of the works of Hippo- 

 crates, 122 and there is no reason to think that it bore a different sense 

 when used as a title of distinctively philosophical writings. 

 , If it were our purpose to treat fully of the uses of (j>vo-is we should 

 have to gather and discuss here the multitudinous meanings of the term 

 which fall under the third head. This we could not do, however, with- 

 out unduly and unprofitably increasing the bulk of this study ; for most 

 developments of <£iW, regarded as the end of the process (III.), are of 

 slight interest for the particular purposes of our inquiry. We may 

 therefore here content ourselves with a summary glance at the ramifica- 

 tions of this main branch, adding such observations as may serve to 

 throw light on philosophical and scientific conceptions. 



We may then regard </>uo-is, as the end of the process, from without 

 or from within. As seen from without it is the outward constitution 

 or frame of a thing (III. A) ; viewed from within, it is its inner consti- 

 tution or character. Under the former head we may distinguish (1) 

 the individual frame, 123 (2) the specific or generic, 124 (3) the uni- 



122 See above, n. 10 and n. 93. The titles of Hippocrates are probably not origi- 

 nal, since in many instances they are in doubt, some works that bear specific titles 

 being clearly parts of larger wholes. This is in keeping with the facts mentioned 

 below, n. 204, relative to philosophical works. But in the case of Hippocrates the 

 title iu most cases merely reproduces in abbreviated form the subject as stated in the 

 body of the work ; and the invariable meaning of <pvais, when used by Hippocrates 

 in reference to the subject-matter of discourse, is "constitution." 



123 In the individual, (pvcris denotes primarily the (perfect) stature attained, els 

 dvdpa reXeiov, els pArpov ijXiidas, as Paul says, Eph. 4, 13. This is Aristotle's 

 ivTe\4x eia i f° r which the whole creation groaneth. Aesch., Pcrs. 441 aK/xcuoi <pvaiv 

 shows that this association of ideas was popular. 



124 This head includes 0i5crts in the sense of 'birth,' 'lineage,' 'family,' and 

 tpticns as sex ; for sex is a yivos. It also embraces 6vt}tt) <pv<ns, Democritus, fr. 297, 

 Soph., 0. T. 869, fr. 515, and Aesch., Ag. 633 xtfoeds Qfotv, 'earth's brood. ' As 

 (a) under this head should be classed cpvais denoting not the yevos itself but the 



