112 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 



since, in order to interact, things must, according to his theory, he 

 generically alike, though specifically they may be opposite or neutral 

 in character. For logical theory, again, the universal is the foundation 

 of the intelligible world. 



It was said above that while the inquiry -n-epl <£iWws regarded pri- 

 marily the constitution of the world, viewed as a given fact, it did 

 naturally imply a question as to its constituents and hence as to its 

 origin. To this we have now added that this implied question in- 

 volved for nearly all philosophers of early Greece the conception of <pvo-is 

 as a Adyos p'fcws. 126 In effect we had already adverted to this fact in 

 referring to the chemical definition of things as a congener of the med- 

 ical prescription. In a curious passage m Aristotle dimly perceives 

 that the Adyos pi£«os, which he appears to recognize only in Empedo- 

 cles, is intimately related to logical definition, though he seems more 

 fully aware of their differences than of their fundamental likeness. 

 Chemical definition seeks to determine what matter entered into the 

 making of the thing. Whether this matter is of one or more kinds 

 makes little difference ; since even the monist must somehow give 

 variety to his unitary substance, and the Greek mouists in particular 

 appear to have conceived of concrete things as ' blends ' of the deriva- 

 tive forms of matter. Logical definition, on the other hand, aims to 

 discover what meanings or marks (teleologically interpreted) constitute 

 the idea of the thing. Each method arrives at a Adyos : the first at a 

 Adyos /xtt'ews ; the second, at a Adyos oiWs. 128 In the Aristotelian 

 scheme </>do-is, as the Adyos oiWas, is the " formal cause." Among the 

 pre-Socratics, the Adyos yu.t£ews of the cosmos was the object of scienti- 

 fic inquiry ; and it was ^vo-is in this sense which, as we have seen, 

 appears in the titular FTepi <piWos. 



Thus far we have considered chiefly the physical oWis or constitu- 

 tion (III. B, 1) ; but we must not overlook the fact that with the 



126 Cp. n. 90 above. For <pv<rts involving \6yos p.L£eus see Pamienides, fr. 16 and 

 Epicharmus, fr. 2. The latter fragment, whether rightly or wrongly attributed to 

 Epicharmus, clearly reflects the thought of Heraclitus, a supposed monist. On this 

 subject see my study of Qualitative Change. 



" T Be Partt. Animal. 642 a 2-31. The passage is too long to transcribe, but 

 will well repay study. 



128 I cannot help feeling that the periphrastic use of <pu<rts is a by-product of 

 logical definition and hence essentially peculiar to the Socratic period. The presence 

 of such phrases as d tu> api8p.& (pvats, ras tQ> aireipw Kal avorpw ml a\6yu) cpvaios 

 alongside aptdfibs ml a ro&ru ovaia and to" tu> dpidp-Co yeveq. (fr. 11), in Philolaus 

 casts grave suspicion on the supposed fragments ; for ovaia in the pre-Socratics 

 means not 'essence,' but 'reality.' Natorp, to be sure, in Philos. Monatshefte, 

 21, pp. 577, 582, finds a deep significance in these same phrases. 



