120 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 



matter. Of this one would be most thoroughly convinced if one at- 

 tended their disputations ; for when the self-same men dispute with 

 one another in the presence of the self-same auditors, the same man 

 never thrice in succession prevails in argument ; but now one prevails, 

 now another, and again he who has the most flowing speech before the 

 mob. Surely it is fair to demand that he who claims to have the 

 right opinion about things should cause his argument always to pre- 

 vail, assuming that his opinion is true and that he properly sets it 

 forth. As for me, I think that such men for want of understanding 

 refute one another by the terms of their very argument and establish 

 the contention of Melissus." 



If, now, we recall to mind those ideals and conceptions anticipated 

 above in the first section of this study, we shall have a fair notion of 

 science as it was conceived among the Greeks of the fifth century b. c. 

 But we have still to inquire just what questions the scientist addressed 

 to nature ; and to this quest we may now tarn. 



Science essays to determine the facts and to explain them. The one 

 thing depends upon the other. If you find a rock and ask what it is, 

 it becomes necessary to discover whether it is in position or not. It 

 proves to be a boulder, and examination shows that it is metamorphic 

 in character : finally it is identified as Laurentian, and its presence 

 here is explained by reference to glacial action. The definition of the 

 fact involves the explanation ; but explanation is the motive of the sci- 

 entific study of the fact, in contrast to the practical interest which leads 

 merely to classification. The curious child, no less than the philoso- 

 pher, asks the question, Why? But, while almost any answer, judi- 

 ciously framed, will satisfy the child, the philosopher knows that the 

 question may receive very different answers accordiug to its specific 

 intention. To ask why is to demand an explanation ; and ' cause ' is 

 our generic name for explanation. Different as individual attempts at 

 explanation may be, they are reducible to a few kinds. We are famil- 

 iar with the four-fold causal principle of Aristotle, and with the fact 

 that, while recognizing four kinds of causation and insisting that in ex- 

 planation one should adduce all causes, he did not find it possible to 

 reduce all to one, but was compelled to content himself in the ultimate 

 analysis with two- 161 



This is, of course, not the place to discuss matters of metaphysics 

 except so far as they pertain or contribute to our purpose ; but there 

 is here a point of some interest for us. We have noted that of Aris- 

 totle's causes, the material points to the past. It is that which is 



161 Cp. Ritter-Preller, §§ 395-396. 



