HEIDEL. — EUpl <J>vo-eo>s. 1 27 



sort they may desire, or whether they do not even conceive such a hope, 

 but are content merely to know how these phenomena occur." The 

 difference between the physical and the teleological points of view is 

 beautifully illustrated by the story told by Plutarch in his Life of Per- 

 icles : 184 " It is related that on a certain occasion the head of a goat 

 with a single horn was brought from the country to Pericles, and that 

 Lampon, the seer, when he saw the strong, solid horn growing out of 

 the middle of the forehead, said that, there being in the city two rivals 

 for power, Thucydides and Pericles, the power would come to the one 

 to whom the sign was given. Anaxagoras, however, cutting open the 

 skull, showed that the brain was not fully developed at the base, but 

 shrunken from its integument and coming somewhat to a point, egg- 

 like, at the spot where the horn sprouted. At the time Anaxagoras 

 was applauded by those who were present ; but Lampon's turn came 

 shortly afterwards, when the power of Thucydides was broken and the 

 affairs of the people came steadily under the direction of Pericles. 

 There was nothing, however, so far as I can see, in the way of the phy- 

 sical philosopher and the seer 185 being equally in the right, the one 



state of his poem we are not in position to judge. The promise of fr. 2 is sufficiently 

 modest (cp. Parmenides, fr. 10 and 11). I incline to think that fr. Ill belongs to 

 the concluding passage of his philosophical poem, and voices the high hopes of the 

 author that the secrets of nature will soon be laid bare. The age of Empedocles 

 was intoxicated with the new wine of science and regarded nothing as too difficult 

 to explain. Once the principles were fully understood, as in certain sciences (e.g. 

 medicine, as we have seen) they were by some even then thought to be, it was not 

 strange that men should hope to perform wonders of science equal to the most 

 ambitious miracles of magic. 



184 C. 6. 



186 It is certain that the Socratic teleology, whether suggested by Socrates' 

 reverence for fiavTiicf) or not, came to the rescue of divination at a time when it was 

 in a bad way, as we may see from Thucydides. The identity of the two points of 

 view is apparent: the question remains whether teleology is immanent in the process 

 of nature or imposed on it from without. In a way fiavTixr; differs from iaTopiq 

 chiefly in this that the latter attempts to know the present by reconstructing the 

 past, while the former seeks to infer the future from the present. Hence the words 

 of Pindar, Pyth. 9, 48 ff. are interesting : Ktipiov Ss irdvrwv rtXos | dtada (Apollo) koX 

 irdaas KeXevdovs . . . x& TL fJ-eXXei, x^bdev iaaerai, ed Kadopq.s. Knowledge of the 

 endj implies teleology : 6 ti fie'XXei is o ti £<jti thrown into the future, and b-wbdev 

 'iaaera.1 refers to the KeXevOoi, as Gildersleeve rightly says. Compare the praise of 

 (Anaxagorean ?) physical philosophy in Eurip. fr. 910 (the text of Diels, Vorsokr. 

 299, 23) 8Xj3ios 8<ttis rrjs iuTOpias | &rxe p.ddr\Giv | /x^re ttoXitioi> ivl ■K-r)p.oawr\v \ p.rp-'' 

 els dSlxovs Trpd^eis bpp.Civ, | dXX* dOavdrov KadopCiv Screws | k6ct/xov dy-qpiov, rj t e 

 avviarri \ x&t.V X<^ ,rwJ - What and hoto are the main questions ; the latter 

 includes the story, and hence the beginnings. Compare Plato, Phard. 97 C el oiV 

 rtj fiovXoiTO Trjv alrtav evpelv trepl ixdcrTov 8tttj ylyverai fj dirbWvTcu 1} '£gti with 96 A 

 VTT€p7}<f>apos ydp fxoi idoKei (sc. i] aocpla, t)v 5tj KaXovcri wepi (pvaeciis iaropiav), ko.1 

 eldevai ras alrias e/cdcrrou, 5tct H ylyverai eKaarov Kal Sid rl dTrbXXvrai kclI Sid ri tan. 



