558 mSTIXCT OF INSECTS. 



stinct is the chief guide of insects, they are endowed also with no incon- 

 siderable portion of reason. 



Some share of reason is denied by few philosophers of the present day 

 to the larger animals. But its existence has not generally (except by 

 those who reject instinct altogether) been recognised in insects : probably 

 on the ground that, as the proportions of reason and of instinct seem to 

 coexist in an inverse ratio, the former might be expected to be extinct in 

 a class in which the latter is found in such perfection. This rule, however, 

 though it may hold good in man, whose instincts are so few and imper- 

 fect, and whose reason is so pre-eminent, is far from being confirmed by an 

 extended survey of the classes of animals generally. Many quadrupeds, 

 birds, and fishes, with instincts apparently not very acute, do not seem to 

 have their place supplied by a proportionably superior share of reason ; 

 and insects, as I think the facts I have to adduce will prove, though rank- 

 ing so low in the scale of creation, seem to enjoy as great a degree of 

 reason as many animals of the superior classes, yet in combination with 

 instincts much more numerous and exquisite, 



I must premise, iiowever, that in so perplexed and intricate afield, lam 

 sensible how necessary it is to tread with caution. A far greater collec- 

 tion of facts must be made, and the science of metaphysics generally be 

 placed on a more solid foundation than it now can boast, before we can 

 pretend to decide, in numerous cases, which of the actions of insects are 

 to be deemed purely instinctive, and which the result of reason. What I 

 advance, therefore, on this head, I wish to be regarded rather as conjec- 

 tures, that, after the best consideration I am able to give to a subject so 

 much beyond my depth, seem to me plausible, than as certainties to which 

 I require your implicit assent. 



That reason has nothing to do with the major part of the actions of in- 

 sects is clear, as I have before observed, from the determinateness and 

 perfection of these actions, and from their being performed independently 

 of instruction and experience. A young bee (1 must once more repeat) 

 betakes itself to the complex operation of building cells with as much skill 

 as the oldest of its compatriots. We cannot suppose that it has any 

 knowledge of the purposes for which the cells are destined ; or of the effects 

 that will result from its feeding the young larvte, and the like. And if an 

 individual bee be thus destitute of the very materials of reasoning as to its 

 main operations, so must the society in general. 



Nor in those remarkable deviations and accommodations to circumstances, 

 instanced under a former head, can we, for considerations there assigned, 

 suppose insects to be influenced by reason. These deviations are still 

 limited in number, and involve acts far too complex and recondite to spring 

 from any process of ratiocination in an animal whose term of life does not 

 exceed two years. 



It does not follow, however, that reason may not have a part in inducing 

 some of these last-mentioned actions, though the actions themselves are 

 purely instinctive. I do not pretend to explain in what way or degree they 

 are combined ; but certainly some of the facts do not seem to admit of 

 explanation, except on this supposition. Thus, in the instance above cited 

 from Huber, in which the bees bent a comb at right angles in order to 

 avoid a slip of glass, the remarkable variations in the form of the cells can 

 only, as I have there said, be referred to instinct. Yet the original deter- 

 mination to avoid the glass seems, as Huber himself observes, to indicate 



