ProGeedings of the Royal Societij of Victoria. 243 



man was suffering from any kind of disease, he was t(3 be held 

 to be irresponsible. It was known, that there were structural 

 diseases of the brain that did not necessarily involve the 

 mental faculties. That the mental faculties were affected to 

 a considerable extent was well known, but it was absurd to 

 infer iri'esponsibility, and to declare that a man wjis not to 

 be punished for his wrongful acts. Especially did it become 

 dangerous and absurd when it was attempted to apply the 

 doctrine to individuals. It was extremely dangerous to apply 

 the doctrine of anthropology to criminal cases. In spite of 

 i-ecent discoveries, we did not know half as much as we 

 would like to know about the functions of the brain, or as 

 much as we hope some day to know. Physiologists know 

 that there are parts of the brain that are well defined, that 

 there are parts that control movements, that there are parts 

 which deal with hearing, speech, and sight, but when it 

 came to the question of learning what particular part of the 

 brain is exclusively concerned with the mental faculties, 

 they would have to depend on what was little more than 

 inference. It was probable that the front part of the brain 

 is that which is concerned with the intellectual and moral 

 faculties. There might be extensive injury to that front 

 part of the brain — parts of it might be lost or degener- 

 ated as the result of disease — but he did not know that it 

 always followed that the mental or moral faculties were 

 deterioiaied in proportion to the amount of brain lost. The 

 average unscientific person was apt to apply to individual 

 cases, appai-ently logically, but still dangerously and unfairly, 

 the scientific generalisation, which was fair enough as regards 

 a particular disease. As to the measure of responsibility of 

 people unmistakably insane, that was a difficult question, 

 with which he was not then prepared to deal. 



Dr. Mullen said it was absolutely neces.sary that lawyers 

 should act on precedents. It was far more important that 

 the law should be as certain as it conld be, than that it 

 should be just. There were many points in it that were 

 unjust, but the prerogative of mercy conld be exercised by 

 the Crown. Of course the law was the true embodiment of 

 everything that was excellent, and it did not deal with 

 motives. Although the motive for an act might influence 

 the amount of pvuiishment inflicted, it could not influence 

 the responsibility of the ])erson who had done wrong. The 

 responsibility of criminals was mixed up with the most 

 important question of the protection of society. If a man 



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