Tfie first of these relates to the fact that 

 the responsible administrator will not wait 

 for the perfect solution to be formulated for 

 each time horizon. He must formulate plans 

 and action programs on a continuing basis. 

 In this instance the economist can indicate 

 those steps which can be taken which will 

 lead toward the optimum solution, or at least 

 toward some "better" solution in the tradition 

 of the theories of second best as discussed 

 in the literature on welfare economics. 



Simultaneously the economist can perform 

 a second function, which would be to construct 

 detailed interim plans and test and evaluate 

 these. These could be constructed for alterna- 

 tive time periods and based upon restrictions 

 suggested by the administrator or the other 

 disciplines where additional intermediate term 

 planning and research was also being con- 

 ducted. 



The result would be an array of economic 

 research considering time horizons from the 

 present to the long run optimum solution. 

 With such an array it would be easier to in- 

 corporate the interdisciplinary (especially 

 social) aspects of the overall problem as sug- 

 gested in the other points I am presenting 

 here. Most critical is the fact that immediate 

 steps are necessary if there is to be a fishery 

 to optimize in the long i-un. 



(6) Theoretical Versus Workirig Models: 

 This point relates to the previous issue and 

 also to several of the following. Brieflly the 

 question here is whether theoretical models, 

 confined solely to a select number of variables, 

 and seldom involving more than two disci- 

 plines, can be utilized directly for generating 

 a stream of benefits to be included in the calcu- 

 lation of a benefit/cost ratio for a particular 

 management program. Some have argued that 

 there is not sufficient realism in theoretical 

 models for these to be applied directly. Con- 

 versely, it may also be argued that many of 

 the imperfections of this approach are not so 

 much inherent in the theoretical models them- 

 selves, but rather stem from the use of com- 

 plementary information when performing B/C 

 analysis. Such errors may be found principal- 

 ly on the cost side, where not all indirect pro- 

 gram costs are included, especially when 

 these costs may exceed the actual flow of 



benefits in the short run. What may be the 

 most significant of these cost components is 

 discussed next. 



(7) Social Transfer Costs: Not long ago it 

 was not possible to discuss limited entry ex- 

 cept under the most constrained circumstances. 

 Now, with the development of more forceful 

 arguments and with a growing urgency in 

 certain fisheries, limited entry plans are re- 

 ceiving wider consideration. As this occurs 

 the operational elements of alternative plans 

 are being formulated and new questions are 

 resulting. The most prominent among these 

 relates to the magnitude of the social transfer 

 costs which may result from either the direct 

 or indirect reduction of the fishing labor 

 force in a fishery. 



If displaced labor must be retrained and 

 relocated, or absorbed on the welfare rolls, 

 it may be wise to develop programs based 

 exclusively on excluding excessive new entry, 

 with input balances to be attained via attri- 

 tion. This is tantamount to concluding that 

 the short run solution must be contrary to 

 the suggested long run optimum. Neverthe- 

 less, it is the desired means of achieving the 

 long run optimum. Research is now begin- 

 ning on this issue both within the National 

 Marine Fisheries Sei^vice and the Office of 

 Sea Grant Programs. The results will play 

 a critical part in determining the character 

 of future management plans. 



(8) Encouraging Exit Versus Limiting Entry: 

 Virtually all discussions of management plans 

 emphasize licenses, or quotas, or some form 

 of right which will accrue to a reduced num- 

 ber of harvesting units. The mechanics of 

 reducing these units involve some form of 

 exclusion. Seldom has a plan been suggested, 

 however, which emphasizes a program where- 

 by excess inputs would be attracted away 

 from the fishery by a more rewarding altern- 

 ative. 



To my knowledge such a program has been 

 attempted once, a recent attempt to divert 

 excess capacity from the overfished haddock 

 resource of the Northwest Atlantic to the 

 underutilized pollock resource. As a limited 

 short term program it met with only limited 

 success. This is not inconsistent with other 



