appropriate to multiple use situations in the 

 oceans with external forces. In these activities 

 the strength of their bargaining position will 

 depend heavily on their having rationalized 

 both the economic and biological sides of the 

 fisheries. Regardless of what potential eco- 

 nomic yields may be or what social pressure 

 for employment is present, a realized net 

 economic yield of zero from fishing does not 

 provide an adequate base for defending ocean 

 space for commerical fisheries in competition 

 with the oil industry, recreational use, power 

 generation, etc. 



In recent years progress has been made 

 by governments, fisheries commissions, and 

 academic researchers in the analysis of fish- 

 eries problems. What are the elements of this 

 analysis that may be utilized to help reorient 

 our approach to fisheries management? 



The long run partial equilibrium systems 

 constructed thus far make a major contribu- 

 tion by an exposition of the problems in static 

 terms. It is clear, however, that they are in- 

 adequate for resource management. In most 

 circumstances they do provide limits within 

 which the regulatoiy process may operate. 

 In the analysis of particular species the dis- 

 tinction between the net economic yield and 

 the maximum sustainable physical yield is 

 subject to empirical verification depending on 

 the unit value of the species, but in any case 

 it is a second order question. In any set of 

 priorities established for fisheries manage- 

 ment the first is to move toward meeting the 

 criteria of economic efficiency, probably by 

 establishing limits on entiy. Once the fisheiy 

 is rationalized then the solution to the prob- 

 lem of the appropriate level of output should 

 be greatly simplified. This follows from the 

 nature of the adjustments that must be made 

 in the process of economic rationalization. 

 The administrators will be forced to consider 

 simultaneously the appropriate amount of 

 fishing effort (amount of inputs) relative to 

 the forecast of the frequency distribution of 

 supply and the impact of productivity changes 

 on fishing effort. Once the fishery is defined 

 in this way, the economic implications and 

 advantages of various levels of output will 

 be more apparent to all and self interest, 

 which today drives producers toward over- 

 fishing the resource, will move them toward 



limiting the catch to maximize the net yield 

 from the resource.-"^ 



Given recognition of the long I'un bio- 

 economic limits, the adequacy of the regula- 

 tory mechanism may be evaluated in terms 

 of how well it handles the short run maxim- 

 ization problem and its success in restructur- 

 ing the fishery from a disequilibrium position 

 (excess capacity) to one of equilibrium. This 

 latter will require evaluation of the possibil- 

 ities inherent in aggregative yield functions 

 and clarification of the goal of a workably 

 competitive structure for the fisheries. The 

 rents captured in the rationalization process 

 are available to finance this transition. In 

 these Utopian circumstances the essence of 

 the internal regulatory mechanism will be 

 found in the interaction between changes in 

 biological supply, prices, and technology. 



LITERATURE CITED 



BELL, F.W., and E. W. CARLSON, 1970. The Pro- 

 ductivity of the Sea and Malthusian Scarcity. Work- 

 ing Paper Number 48, National Marine Fisheries 

 Service. Draft Manuscript. 



CRUTCHFIELD, JAMES A., and GIULIO PONTE- 

 CORVO, 1969. The Pacific Salmon Fishery; A Study 

 of Irrational Conservation. Published for Resources 

 for the Future, Inc., The Johns Hopkins Press, Balti- 

 more. 



GULLAND. J. A.. 1968. Population Dynamics of the 

 Penavian Anchoveta. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 

 Number 72. Rome. 



HOLT. S. J., 1962. Comments made in discussion 

 of Dickie. L. M. Effects of Fishery Regulations on 

 the Catch of Fish. In: Economic Effects of Fishery 

 Regulation, R. Hamlich, ed. FAO Fishery Report 

 Number 5. Rome. pp. 141-142. 



McHUGH, J. L.. 1962. Comments made in discussion 

 of Dickie, L. M. Effects of Fishei-y Regulations on 



^® This statement is more than a pious hope but 

 less than a certainty. Its validity depends in part on 

 the nature of the frequency distribution of catch among 

 the participants in the fishery, i.e., if the fishery were 

 the property of a monopolist he would operate at the 

 level of the net economic yield. Only under certain 

 assumptions will this be true of the behavior of a set 

 of competitors. Their recognition of the desirability 

 of maximizing aggregate net i-evenue will come as a 

 process of education as studies of the characteristics 

 of the fisheiy reveal the advantages inherent in various 

 alternatives. 



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