Multiple Objectives for Marine Resource Management^ 



R. Bruce Rettig^ 



ABSTRACT 



Management decisions suggested by recent bioeconomic models have been largely 

 disregarded by fishery managers. This negligible impact may be due to error on the 

 part of management, an incomplete grasp of the role of noneconomic objectives, and/or 

 the possibility that more sophisticated economic models might yield markedly different 

 results. More sophisticated models are suggested which consider the problem of second 

 best, risk and uncertainty, transaction and adjustment costs, and income redistribution. 

 Creation of analytical systems amenable to treatment of noneconomic variables along 

 with economic variables is suggested. 



During the past two decades, a growing body 

 of economists has been articulating a rationale 

 for management of ocean fisheries which is 

 based upon the principle of maximum sustain- 

 able net economic yield. The usual paradigm 

 emphasizes the lack of clearly defined property 

 rights and arrives at a conclusion of a need for 

 limited entry, most commonly suggested through 

 a system of licensing and/or taxes. While the 

 better analyses have often hedged their con- 

 clusions with a set of qualifications, even these 

 balanced policy programs are rejected by 

 authorities actually responsible for fishery 

 management. 



That articulate arguments from a respected 

 cross-section of the economics profession con- 

 tinue to carry only minor weight with their 

 intended audience is quite disconcerting. This 

 paper consists of an examination of two possible 

 reasons for the treatment of the bioeconomic 

 models to date. The first possibility is a diver- 

 gence between what public authorities consider 

 appropriate objectives to pursue and the assump- 

 tions of goals implicit or explicit in the bio- 

 economic models. The second possibility is that 

 bioeconomic models are incompletely specified 

 and that more complete models would be beitter 

 received. A third possibility that will not be 

 handled in this paper is that existing analysis 

 is correct and that all that remains is to 



' Oregon Agi-iculture Experiment Station, Technical 

 Paper 2996. Research for this paper was supported by 

 N.S.F. Institutional Sea Grant. GH-45. 



- Department of Agricultural Economics, Oregon 

 State University. 



educate the resource managers on the merits of 

 implementing the correct suggestions already 

 available. 



THE ELUCIDATION AND 

 LEGITIMIZATION OF SOCIAL GOALS 



The characteristic of the fishery which lies 

 at the root of the problem is the lack of clearly 

 defined property rights over the fishing ground. 

 The severe depletion of such fisheries as the 

 Pacific halibut fishery and the sardine fishery 

 off the California coast stand as stark testimony 

 to the value of property rights. That the problems 

 associated with fisheries can be easily related to 

 the absence of property rights is seen by con- 

 sidering the central economic functions of 

 property as set forth recently by Bjork (1969, 

 p. 65): 



First, it provides incentives for the creation and 

 improvement of assets. Second, it provides incen- 

 tives for efficient control of existing assets. Third, 

 it rations the use of scarce assets to ensure that 

 they will be used for those purposes which society 

 values most highly. 



Bjork argues that property rights exist largely 

 because stable market-oriented societies value 

 the performance of these functions so highly. 



Investment incentives, efficient allocation of 

 fishing effort and living fish, and distribution to 

 him who values the resource most highly are 

 indeed the central objectives behind the bio- 

 economic models of current interest. These are 

 not apparently the sole objectives of the societies 



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