yield would be maximized subject to certain 

 constraints on acceptable rules for redistributing 

 income and constraints with respect to minimum 

 levels of the assorted noneconomic objectives. 

 There is no denying that this system solves the 

 problem of weighting the various objectives 

 by simply avoiding the problem. While weights 

 are not explicitly chosen, they are implicit in 

 the levels of the noneconomic variables selected. 

 Consequently, some technique will have to be 

 devised for continuous reconsideration of non- 

 economic objectives with periodic adjustments 

 in the level of the constraints being made by 

 an authority responsible to society. 



The technique of constrained maximization 

 will operate best where clear threshold levels 

 of other variables can be designated. In cases of 

 international fisheries management, it will 

 operate best when the parties to the international 

 agreement can agree on the objectives other 

 than net economic yield and when relative 

 weights of more than one species can be specified 

 where more than one commercially important 

 species is affected by the management decision. 

 When this is not true, a third technique of 

 explicitly agi-eeing on relative weights of several 

 objectives and maximizing the weighted function 

 may be superior. 



It may well be that developing a general 

 theory of fisheiy management is to develop an 

 empty theory. Special consideration will be 

 needed for different species of fish and different 

 groups of nations. Nonetheless, it is apparent 



that management of ocean fisheries is desired. 

 It is also apparent that biological criteria are 

 not sufficient to manage a resource in a world 

 in which there are more goals than merely 

 consuming one particular species of fish. It is 

 thus incumbent upon us to try to specify public 

 policy actions which public authorities can 

 undertake to achieve the best possible mix of a 

 large assortment of goals. 



LITERATURE CITED 



BJORK. GORDON C, 1969. Private Enterprise and 

 Pulilic Interest, Prentice-Hall, Inc., p. 6.5. 



BOULDING, KENNETH. 1969. Economics as a Moral 

 Science, .\merican Economic Review, 59(1) : 1-12. 



CRUTCHFIELD, JAMES, and GIULIO PONTECORVO, 

 1969. The Pacific Salmon Fisheries, The Johns Hopkins 

 Press, p. 35. 



FAO, 1962. Economic Effects of Fishery Rejjuiation. 

 FAO Fisheiies Report No. 5. Rome. 



PLOURDE, C. G., 1970. A Simple Model of Replenishable 

 Natural Resource Exploitation. American Economic 

 Review, 60(,3): 518-522. 



ROTHENBERG, JEROME. 1961. The Measurement of 

 Social Welfare, Prentice-Hall, Inc., pp. 80-103. 



SCOTT, ANTHONY, 1962. The Economics of Regrulating 

 Fisheries, FAO Fisheries Report No. 5, Economic 

 Effects of Fishery Regulation, p. 32. 



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