Crutchfield and Pontecorvo, 1969). Let it be 

 sufficient to say that there is both theoretical 

 ambiguity and a lack of empirical information 

 on the private and public costs associated with 

 han'esting open-access resources (Bromley, 

 1969). 



Two lines of thought, however, would prob- 

 ably receive acceptance by this group. The 

 first is that in the short nin, hatchery produc- 

 tion could increase output in most salmon 

 fisheries with only minor increases in associ- 

 ated harvesting costs, since excess capacity 

 does exist. The Crutchfield-Pontecorvo re- 

 search supports this for the Pacific salmon 

 fisheries. The second argument is that the 

 open-access tradition insures that resource 

 augmentation through publicly operated hatch- 

 eries will induce additional effort into the fish- 

 ery, especially when the additional inputs are 

 provided without cost to the fishermen. The 

 resultant equilibrium levels of factor returns, 

 output prices, and excess capacity may differ 

 from initial equilibrium levels, but a prion 

 speculation about empirical magnitudes is just 

 that. Furthermore, the time pattern of adjust- 

 ment and the distribution of benefits and costs, 

 over both time and space, can be discerned 

 only vaguely. 



We would maintain, however, that resource 

 augmentation efforts should be placed in per- 

 spective with the total institutional setting." 

 Hatcheiy contributions to fish stocks may per- 

 petuate the tendency toward excess harvesting 

 capacity, but it should not have to bear the 

 entire burden of responsibility for economic 

 and social ills of the fishery. The tendency 

 toward excess capacity pervades open-access 

 fisheries, most of which do not rely on hatchery 

 propagation. It would be our guess that the 

 magnitude of inefficiency associated with the 

 larger issue probably overshadows any un- 

 desirable effects of hatchery production, if the 

 latter in fact exist. 



Having confessed that we do not have all 

 the answers, we hasten to add that we do have 

 some empirical observations on entry and exit, 

 over time, of salmon harvesting resources. We 

 view these not as definitive proof of anything, 

 but as a piece of the empirical jigsaw puzzle 



" We are indebted to Emery Castle for this pers- 

 pective. 



which must eventually be put together if econ- 

 omists are to be looked to for policy advice. 



Entry and Exit of Resources in the 



Commercial Salmon Harvest: 



Fixed Asset Theory 



The rise and fall of the Pacific Coast salmon 

 harvest has been well documented elsewhere 

 (Cooley, 1963 and Crutchfield and Pontecorvo, 

 1969). Peak harvest years were reached in 

 the 1930's, and catch has trended downward 

 since that time. The quantity of resources com- 

 mitted to the fishery, however, has increased 

 over time. The number of fishermen and the 

 net tonnage of vessels increased by about 30% 

 between 1947-1949 and 1964-1966 periods,' 

 total landings declined by about 25% , and the 

 deflated value of landings per fisherman de- 

 creased by about 15% (Table 4). It appears, 

 however, that the deflated average value of 

 landings per fisherman has remained about 

 constant since 1950, with year-to-year fluctu- 

 ations. This can be taken, recognizing the limi- 

 tations on accuracy of the data, as very super- 

 ficial evidence of the open-access phenomenon, 

 i.e., the dissipation of rents through entiy of 

 additional resources. 



Even though there has been net entry into 

 the fishery since 1947, the time path of entry 

 and exit of harvesting resources has not been 

 fully explored. In particular, is there a degree 

 of symmetry between the relationships which 

 explain entry, on one hand, and exit, on the 

 other? Miss Peerarat Aungurarat attempted 

 to answer this question in another portion of 

 our Sea Grant research at Oregon State Uni- 

 versity (1970). Her results are especially inter- 

 esting in light of the increased reliance on 

 hatchery programs. 



Conventional firm theoiy -uggests that a 

 high degree of symmetry would exist in ex- 

 plaining entry and exit of resources. Given a 

 constant factor price, leftward (rightward) 

 shifts in the marginal value product function 

 would imply a reduction (increase) in the 

 utilization of a factor of production. Dissatis- 

 faction with the state of the arts in explaining 

 the inelastic supply of agricultural products 

 led Glenn L. Johnson to formulate a "fixed 

 asset" theory (1958). Johnson's contribution 



140 



