law that specifically permitted additional ton- 

 nage to the fleet concerned the "in between" 

 craft between 100 and 180 tons. These were 

 granted permission to enlarge to 240 tons, 

 about the smallest sized vessel that could 

 operate effectively south of the equator from 

 Japanese ports. 



Landings from the longline fishery peaked 

 in 1962. Declines in catches from that year, 

 increased competition in international markets 

 from the Taiwanese and Korean fisheries, and 

 sudden rises in labor costs greatly reduced 

 pressure for further expansion of the fleet. The 

 "39-ton" fleet was brought back into the 

 limited entry system in 1964 with a passage 

 of a law that established a "near seas" skipjack- 

 tuna industry. The law limited the number of 

 licenses for 20- to 50-ton craft engaged in the 

 skipjack-tuna fishery to 1,850 vessels, a number 

 selected primarily because it was sufficiently 

 large to cover all craft of this size range al- 

 ready in the fishery. In 1964, 1,708 craft were 

 licensed and registered under this law but 

 the number has declined slightly since. 



Changes in the regulatory system since the 

 near seas fleet was established have been 

 relatively few in number compared to earlier 

 years. As longline catches declined, the pole- 

 and-line live bait fishery received increased 

 attention. The more substantial changes in 

 regulations have been designed to permit or 

 encourage decommissioning of large vessels 

 to build smaller vessels for this fishery. Strong 

 pressure has developed since the mid-1960's 

 for reduction in the size of the fleet. Agreement 

 appears to be general that this should be done 

 but as yet an acceptable method to do so has 

 not been devised. 



EFFECTS ON DIFFERENT ASPECTS 

 OF THE FISHERY 



As can been seen from the above oferly 

 simplified description, measures for regula- 

 tion of the Japanese skipjack-tuna fishery center 

 strongly on limitation of the size and number 

 of craft. Only minor use has been made of 

 catch quotas and restrictions on place of fish- 

 ing, measures that tend to reduce the efficiency 

 of use of vessels and equipment. The fleet as 

 it developed is very much a result of regulation 

 through use of limited entry and controls on 

 size of vessels. Discussion will now turn to 



the major effects, some obvious and foreseen, 

 some less obvious and forseen dimly if at all, 

 that the regulatory system had on the fishery. 



Capital Acquisition and Resource Allocation 



One of the more striking aspects of the fishery 

 was the rapidity with which the fleet was ex- 

 panded after the Allied Occupation ended. 

 Vessels used in the fishery are not extraordi- 

 narily large as fishing vessels go nor were 

 construction costs in Japan high by any stand- 

 ard. However, they do represent a sizeable 

 capital investment and requirements for operat- 

 ing capital are substantial. Owner-operator 

 enterprises dominated the fishery in the early 

 days. This meant that most were small enter- 

 prises headed by individuals with poorly estab- 

 lished lines to sources of capital. Two- and 

 three-boat enterprises became common by the 

 early 1960's but the fishery continues to be 

 made up largely of small enterprises. The 

 large fishing corporations of Japan have played 

 and continue to play a relatively minor role 

 in the fishery. 



The effect the system as applied had on 

 acquistion of capital is, of course, obvious. Li- 

 censes from the beginning became, for all 

 practical purposes, the personal property of 

 the recipient. As such they were sold, traded, 

 or used as security for loans. Even at the de- 

 pressed tuna prices of the mid-1950's, license 

 values ranged from 10% to 20% of construction 

 costs for a vessel. At 1962 earning levels, the 

 value of the license almost equaled that of 

 the vessel. With security of this nature to 

 offer, no license holder had any difficulty in 

 gaining loans for either fixed or operating 

 capital. Without the limited entry system and 

 property characteristics of the licenses, the 

 fishery possibly would have expanded more 

 slowly, paradoxical though this may sound. 

 Enlargement of craft also would have been 

 more dificult had these valuable licenses not 

 been available to use as security for loans. 

 One could postulate that the fleet would have 

 come to consist of a much larger number of 

 smaller craft without it, although larger craft 

 constructed and owned by large corporations 

 may have come to dominate the fishery. 



Licenses decreased in value rather precipi- 

 tously after 1962 to a low of about $330 in 



153 



