1965 (Commercial Fisheries Review, 1966, 

 p. 73). Rates of indebtedness at the peak of 

 license values in 1962 had been much higher 

 than in other Japanese fisheries. Debts on the 

 fixed capital alone of craft over 200 tons in 

 1962 averaged 72% , almost an inverse ratio to 

 the 30% rate in the East China Sea trawl fish- 

 ery (Masuda, 1963, p. 539). Debts on smaller 

 licensed vessels averaged over 50%. Improve- 

 ment in the earning position of tuna vessels 

 in the late 1960's with the rapid increase in 

 price of tuna in Japan stabilized the economic 

 picture for most owners after 1965. However, 

 many marginal enterprises were forced out 

 of the fishery during the mid-1960's. 



It can also be argued that the licensing sys- 

 tem as it evolved also led to a misallocation 

 of resources within the national economy as 

 a whole. From the standpoint of the national 

 economy, investment in the tuna fishery ob- 

 siously was profitable at least through 1962. 

 However, the high, and at times unrealistic, 

 value of the licenses in the tuna fishery gave 

 this fishery an extremely favorable competi- 

 tive position within financial institutions 

 specializing in fisheries, and, indeed, in the 

 national capital market as a whole. The total 

 investment was substantial and, as proved 

 later, was larger than needed to harvest the 

 resource. Where the investment level would 

 have proved most advantageous is difficult to 

 determine and no effort to do so is known by 

 the author. Few would argue, however, that 

 a better allocation of national resources would 

 not have been obtained had part of the invest- 

 ment in the tuna fleet been directed to other 

 channels. 



Size and Nature of the Fleet 



That the size and characteristics of craft 

 in the fleet was shaped strongly by the regu- 

 latory system is apparent from the earlier dis- 

 cussion of the development of the system. En- 

 largement of craft was a basic and continuing 

 policy throughout the period of expansion. 

 The most effective measure used to fulfill this 

 policy was the frequent granting of additional 

 free licensed tonnage that could only be used 

 with the licensed tonnage of the old vessel 

 which was in turn decommissioned. This, and 

 the practice of allowing only licensed tonnage 



from decommissioned "medium-sized" craft 

 to be used for enlargement under any circum- 

 stances, hurried the disappearance of these 

 smaller licensed craft as well as the construc- 

 tion of larger ones. 



The measures used were highly effective as 

 is shown by the increase in average vessel size 

 from 91 to 230 gross tons between 1952 and 

 1962. It also meant that many vessels were 

 retired well before their useful life was ended. 

 This wasteful aspect was recognized and an 

 attempt made to minimize it by placing mini- 

 mum ages on craft that could be decommis- 

 sioned. That this time was shortened from 6 

 to 4 years for wooden vessels and from 12 

 to 8 years for steel vessels illustrates the pres- 

 sures applied to take advantage of grants of 

 tonnage, grants which usually carried a 2-year 

 maximum for use from the date they were 

 granted. A recognized shortcoming of the sys- 

 tem, it was nevertheless one that was never 

 solved satisfactorily during the period of ex- 

 pansion. 



An unforeseen result, or certainly one that 

 was predicted poorly, concerned adverse ef- 

 fects on the structure of individual vessels. 

 As the fishing grounds became more distant, 

 a premium was placed on hold capacity for 

 fuel and fish. Given the absolute limit on gross 

 tonnage permitted for an individual vessel, 

 the owners designed around this limit with 

 emphasis on increased carrying capacity. First 

 started in the late 1950's, craft with 20% to 

 30% greater carrying capacity were soon being 

 built with no increase in computed tonnage 

 (Masuda, 1963, p. 546). Crew quarters and 

 below-deck working space became more cramp- 

 ed in the process and safety equipment was 

 reduced to the minimum permissible standards 

 and often stowed in inaccessible places. Sea- 

 worthiness also often suffered because of re- 

 arrangement of storage space that decreased 

 stability, a factor that undoubtedly contributed 

 to the loss at sea of a number of smaller craft. 

 Many of these adverse aspects have been cor- 

 rected subsequently but only through greater 

 expenditure of administrative time for inspec- 

 tion, additional tonnage concessions that could 

 not be used for hold space, and a weakening 

 of the competitive position of the fishery for 

 labor because of poor working and living con- 

 ditions while at sea. 



154 



