166 Kansas Academy of Science. 



tion of 7nen for its development; that man can only make progress 

 in cooperative groups. Tribes and nations are cooperative groups, 

 and it is their being so that makes their value,' etc." Prof. Gid- 

 dings comments on this view: 



"Social evolution thus proceeds through the conflict of antagonistic tend- 

 encies, on the one hand, towards uniformity and solidarity, on [the other — 

 toward variation and individuality. Mr. Bageot thus arrived at conclusions 

 that we recognize to-day as being at the core of scientific sociology. So- 

 ciety was a factor in the evolution of man before man became a factor in 

 the evolution of society, and the difference is important. ... In the 

 ' Descent of Man ' Mr. Darwin recognizes the utility of group solidarity, 

 and of the struggle of associated individuals to adjust their interest and 

 activities to each other, that the groujj life maybe maintained. To observe 

 the successive stages and the complications of man's collective struggle for 

 existence is to follow the evolution of tribal society and thence the history 

 of civilization. ... In one favored place, the Athenian city state, 

 society became for a brief period idealistic; that is to say, its bonds were 

 those of a common purpose, or ideal. After 2000 years of arrest and slow 

 recovery, the cosmopolitan society of the Western world is, possibly, once 

 more approaching the Athenian model. And the goal is what? What has 

 evolution done for man? If it be true, indeed, that 'Thro' the ages an in- 

 creasing purpose runs,' is it made manifest in something that we may 

 legitimately call progress? For progress, rightly defined, is more than 

 evolution. It is either race survival with individuation, or it is increasing 

 individual power, capacity and happiness not entailing race extermination 

 Have we made sure of this? We hate to think ill of ourselves, yet the 

 question will recur. Has the survival of the fit become, at length, the sur- 

 vival of the best." 



Of "Darwin's Influence on Philosophy," Prof. John Dewey, of 

 Columbia University, says ( Pop. Sci., July, 1909, p. 90) : 



"The conception that had reigned supreme for 2000 years in the philoso- 

 phy of nature and knowledge, the conceptions that had become the familiar 

 furniture of the mind, rested on the assumption of the superiority of the 

 fixed and final. In laying hands upon the sacred ark of absolute perma- 

 nency, in treating forms of life as originating and then passing away, the 

 ' Origin of Species ' introduced a mode of thinking that in the end was bound 

 to transform knowledge, and hence the treatment of morals, politics and 

 religion. . . . (P. 93:) The exact bearings on philosophy of the new 

 logical outlook are, of course, as yet uncertain and inchoate. We live in the 

 twilight of an intellectual transition. One must add the rashness of the 

 prophet to the stubbornness of the partisan to venture a systematic exposi- 

 tion of the influence upon philosophy of the Darwinian method. . . . 

 (P. 96:) When Henry Sidgwick casually remarked in a letter that, as one 

 grew older his interest in what or who made the world was altered into in- 

 terest in what kind of a world it was, anyway, his voicing of a common 

 experience of our own day illustrates also the nature of that intellectual trans- 

 formation effected by the Darwinian logic. Interest shifts from an intelli- 

 gence that shaped things once for all to the particular intelligence that things 

 are even now shaping. . . . (P. 97:) The new logic introduces responsibility 



