2$ PR0CBBDIN08 OF THE 



This bye-law, accepted as adequate in 1904, gives us no 

 iiutlujiity to discuss any commuuicatiou or exhibit. Occupants 

 ot" this chair exceed their reference and you condone their action. 

 Our discussions are always interesting and sometimes useful. 



We are only authorized to examine productions of nature, but 

 we do not always observe the limitation. We have at intervals 

 viewed with interest implements from distant lands and garlands 

 from ancient tombs. If these belong to etlmology or archaeology 

 they also belong to natural history, not from prescriptive right 

 but because our science has duties to other studies. The source 

 of a tool or a fabric is more than a matter of curiosity; its deter- 

 mination is of scientific consequence and may be of economic 

 value. Full knowledge of an artefact may give the ethnologist 

 a clue to the origin of an obscure custom, or the archaeologist a 

 hint as to the kinships of an extinct race. 



Our charter authorizes individual and collective effort to in- 

 crease zoological and botanical knowledge. Our bye-law invites 

 us to communicate our results for entry in our journal-books. 

 We do not treat them like the talent which was laid up in a 

 napkin. We publish them to help others engaged in the study 

 of natural liistory. But our charter leaves us in doubt and our 

 bye-laws do not say whether the cultivation of our science 

 include the application of these results to the business of life. 



Why does the spirit of our practice rise above the letter of our 

 law ? During the Parliamentary wars of the XVII. Century, 

 certain of the " ingenious and curious " formed themselves into 

 an " invisible college.*' Out of this, after the Restoration, grew 

 a philosophical society to promote natural knowledge. In the 

 statute-book of that society there is a bye-law written in 1663 

 which is ampler than our corresponding bye-law. This law 

 tells members " to order, take account, consider, and discourse 

 of philosophical experiments and observations ; to read, hear, 

 and discourse upon letters, reports, and other papers containing 

 philosophical matters ; as also, to view and discourse upon 

 rarities of nature and art : and thereupon to consider, what 

 may be deduced from them, or any of them; and how far they, 

 or any of them, may be improved for use or discovery." 



On comparing our own bye-law with that of our parent-society 

 we find that we have narrowed " philosophical matters " to 

 " subjects of natural history " ; we have widened " rarities " 

 to "productions" of nature; we have left out artefacts. 

 Otherwise our bye-law is the older statute shorn of its in- 

 junctions. But our practice shows that, whatever the intention 

 of our founders may have been, we take these injunctions for 

 granted. On at least one occasion this session we " took account, 

 considered, and discoHrsed of " a philosophical experiment ; we 

 do this for a philosophical observation with every picture thrown 

 upon our screen. We " discourse upon " the papers we hear and 

 the productions of nature we view ; we even examine artefacts 

 when these come before us. Our history is a record of deduction 



