KANT. Iy7 



rived from experience ? How can experience which is contingent pro- 

 duce judgements that are not so? Of an internal modification, for in- 

 stance, 1 judge that it has taken place; this is a judgement of experi- 

 ence. It is contingent; for 1 by no means judge that it has necessarily- 

 taken place. But I thus judge, that after it has taken place, it cannot 

 but have taken place. It is a necessary judgement which no experience 

 teaches me. But judgements wliich do not in any respect depend upon 

 experience, are pure judgements. That a pure judgement should be 

 synthetic, that is to say, that it should by the attribute add a knowledge 

 to the knowledge of the subject, this cannot happen if there are no 

 pure cognitions, that is to say, cognitions that are not altogether depen- 

 dent upon experience, that are not induced a jwsteriori from experimen- 

 tal perceptions ; in other words, cognitions a priori. To seek after, to 

 determine, and to arrange these cognitions, or rather that which is pure, 

 or a priori in knowledge, is to criticise the pure reason — to construct 

 transcendental science. 



No external object can be perceived out of space. Space itself is 

 not perceived ; there are objects that we can only perceive upon the 

 condition of space. It is therefore the condition not of the object, but 

 of the perception* It is necessary to the experience, to the sensibility 

 that perceives ; it is a pure form of the sensibility, and this pure form is 

 a priori in the sensibility. 



No internal perception'can take place but in time. No internal fact, 

 no affection of the me is perceived in space ; but we cannot have con- 

 sciousness but in time. And as there is here neither consciousness nor 

 perception of time, time is not given a posteriori, for no internal percep- 

 tion is possible without it. Time is therefore another condition of in- 

 ternal perception, (not of that which is perceived), or, a pure, a priori 

 form of the sensibility. Space and time, the two pure forms of the sen- 

 sibility, are the object and the basis of the criticism of the pure, or a 

 priori sensibility. 



Besides the sensibility, the me knows by the understanding: that is 

 to say, perceptions are converted into notions. The notion or the con- 

 ception is our thought of the perceived phenomenon. Every notion or 

 cognition of the understanding has the form of judgement. There is 

 no notion or intellectual cognition that cannot be reduced to a judge- 

 ment. But there are many categories of judgments ; there are judge- 

 ments of quantity, of quality, of relation, of modality. These are the 

 foundations of the different categories of the understanding. The cat- 

 egories of judgements, which comprehend all sorts of possible judge- 

 ments^ arc twelve in number. And theie arc no other categories of 



